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Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of
Disparate Treatment by Police
Sonja B. Starrt

Statistical evidence plays a central role in litigation, scholarship,
and public debates about race and policing. At one level, the statistical
picture is clear: people of color in the United States, especially black
men, interact with police far more often than white Americans do.
Black Americans are about 2.5 times more likely to be arrested each
year as their white counterparts. 1 Local studies show even larger racial
disparities in the frequency of stops and use of force, although there are
no national numbers. 2
But while these gaps' existence is not contested, the reasons for
them are. An especially hotly disputed question is whether and to what
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Brensike Primus, Jon Sacks, Margo Schlanger, Michael Steinberg, Matthew Stephenson, and Kirri
Thomas, as well as Legal Forum participants and workshop participants at Harvard, University of
Chicago, University of Michigan, University of Texas, University of Wisconsin, University of
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Andrew Sand provided excellent research assistance.
1
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics Arrest Data Analysis Tool, the 2012 arrest
rate was ten percent for black adults and four percent for whites; disparities are larger for more
serious crimes. The Bureau of Justice Statistics's national estimates are not broken down by
Hispanic ethnicity, or by race and sex combined. Arrest Data Analysis Tool, BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS, http://www. bjs.gov/index.cfm ?ty=datool&surl =/arrests/index.cfm# (follow "National
Estimates" hyperlink, then follow ''Trend Tables by Race" hyperlink).
2
See, e.g., ACLU, BLACK, BROWN, AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010, 1 (2014), https://aclum.org/app/uploads/2015/
06/reports-black-brown-and-targeted. pdf [https: //perma.cc /GT9J -QTSC] (finding large disparities
in pedestrian stop-and-frisk rates in Boston); see Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langan, BUREAU OF
JUST. STATISTICS, NCJ 180987, POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976-1998: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY
POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS (2001), at iii (finding blacks four times as likely
as whites to be killed by police); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of
the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More
Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275-76 (2004) (describing traffic stop disparities); Rachel
Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1139-40 (2013) (calling
for better data collection). A new, federally funded initiative seeks to build a national database on
stops and use of force. Ctr. for Policing Equity, Nation's First Police Profiling Database Awarded
Grant By NSF (Nov. 7, 2013), http://policingequity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/database
_release_final. pdf [https: //perma.cc/XW8B-ZJLK].
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extent these disparities result from police discrimination on the basis of
race. That question, which is the central constitutional issue under
longstanding equal protection doctrine, sharply divides public opinionlargely along racial lines. 3 Among commentators, polar opposite
answers are each often presented as indisputable. 4 In part, these
conflicts persist because the question is very challenging to answer
empirically, due to data limitations and challenges of causal inference.
In this Article, I explore why measuring disparate-treatment
discrimination by police is so difficult, and consider the ways that
researchers' existing tools can make headway on these challenges and
the ways they fall short. Lab experiments have provided useful
information about implicit racial bias, but they cannot directly tell us
how these biases actually affect real-world behavior. Meanwhile, for
observational researchers, there are various hurdles, but the hardest
one to overcome is generally the absence of data on the citizen conduct
that at least partially shapes policing decisions. Most crime, and
certainly most noncriminal "suspicious" or probable-cause-generating
behavior, goes unreported and undetected, and is unobservable to
researchers. The available measures of observed crime are not
necessarily good proxies for total crime, and in any event, such data
generally do not exist at an individual level that can be linked to
individual outcome data on police interactions. Meanwhile, while we
often do have data on the subset of people who are stopped by police,
analyses limited to those individuals are often distorted by selection
bias and by the absence of exogenous measures of their conduct;
researchers have no choice but to rely, circularly, on what police write
down.
These hurdles are serious. Some headway has been made in
particular contexts in which quasi-experimental methods or direct
physical observation by researchers is possible, but most policing
contexts are not readily amenable to these approaches. It may be
possible to do more using survey methods, though these pose their own

3
E.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen
Perceptions, 83 Soc. F. 1009, 1017 (2005) (finding blacks six times likelier than whites to believe

police prejudice is a problem in their city).
4
For example, a recent letter from civil rights and community leaders called the pattern of
"aggressive police tactics [against young black men] ... too obvious to be a coincidence .... [I]t is
time for the country to counter the effects of systemic racial bias." Letter from Maya Rockeymoore
et al., to President Obama (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ad/public/
static/letter/ [https://perma.cc/95ZD-BTBZ]. By contrast, prominent commentator Heather
McDonald stated: ''It is black crime rates that predict the presence of blacks in the criminal justice
system. Not some miscarriage of justice." Meet the Press, NBC (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.
nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet- press-transcript-a ugust-1 7-2014-n 182641
[https: 1/perma.cc /36HS- HFTR].
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challenges. And when it comes to assessing discrimination against
neighborhoods of color (as opposed to individuals), it is sometimes
possible to rely on aggregate-level data to make plausible claims. Often,
however, the limits of available data will mean that it is just not
possible to determine whether the police are discriminating based on
race. These research challenges are also problems for courts, litigants
challenging such discrimination, and police departments themselves as
they seek to comply with their constitutional obligations.
I suggest, in some contexts, that a new approach would work
better. The method I propose is called "auditing," which would employ
"testers" (probably undercover officers) of different races to elicit
possible interactions with the police. Auditing has not been tried or
even discussed in the law enforcement field, which is surprising
because for decades it has been a central tool in antidiscrimination
research and civil rights enforcement more generally. It presents
safety, legality, and efficacy concerns when applied to policing, but with
careful design I argue that these concerns can be overcome. If so,
auditing could provide something observational research usually
cannot: causally rigorous analysis of police discrimination in a realworld setting.
Part I begins by examining why it is important to develop good
methods for measuring "disparate treatment" discrimination by police.
Disparate treatment is certainly not the only source of racial disparity
in policing that researchers or policymakers should care about. That
said, constitutional doctrine forces us to confront the question, and, I
outline other moral and policy reasons for why we should be concerned
about disparate treatment. I also examine the conceptual problems
associated with thinking of racial discrimination as a "cause" of
disparity. In Part II, I examine existing methods of analyzing disparate
treatment: individual- and neighborhood-level regression analyses,
quasi-experimental methods exploiting variation in police ability to
observe race, and lab experiments on implicit bias. In Part III, I set
forth the auditing proposal and explore its advantages, challenges, and
limitations.

I. WHY MEASURING DISPARATE TREATMENT MATTERS
This paper addresses methods of estimating something quite
specific: police racial discrimination of the "disparate treatment"
variety, in the sense that U.S. courts use that term. 5 By this, I mean

5

I use the terms "disparate treatment" and "discrimination" interchangeably throughout
much of the paper, although "discrimination" can also entail broader meanings.
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the extent to which police treat persons who are otherwise similarly
situated (along relevant dimensions that the police perceive) differently
because of race. Disparate treatment by police includes what is
commonly called racial profiling: that is, disparate treatment that is
based on race-based assumptions about differential crime risk. It also
could encompass any other way in which racial perceptions consciously
or unconsciously affect the decision-making of police vis-a-vis
individuals or communities. In Sections A and B, respectively, I briefly
outline some legal and policy reasons that disparate treatment
discrimination is an important target of empirical estimation. In
Section C, I make clear that I do not think this is the only valid way of
conceptualizing racial inequality in policing, and I distinguish it from
other conceptions that are also worthy subjects of empirical, legal, and
policy analysis. Finally, claims of disparate treatment are causal in
nature, and in Section D, I unpack what it means to treat race as a
"cause" in this way.
A.

Racial Profiling and Constitutional Doctrine

Why do we need good empirical estimates of racially disparate
treatment by police officers? The most obvious reason is that the
existence of governmental disparate treatment is the central question
posed by current equal protection doctrine. Current doctrine precludes
constitutional challenges solely premised on racially disparate impact
(i.e., differential effects on different racial groups) 6 or discrimination by
private actors like witnesses. 7 But, as I show here, police racial
discrimination essentially always violates the Equal Protection Clause.
It is, however, difficult to prove, which makes effective empirical
strategies especially important.
Although there is a strong scholarly consensus that racial profiling
should be considered unconstitutional, scholars often question whether
the Supreme Court agrees. Many have critiqued the Court for leaving
the door open to police reliance on race. 8 These critics have grounds for

6

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
One could argue that when the police give effect to private discrimination by carrying out
stops and arrests, state action is generated. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948)
(barring judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants). But doctrinally, this is likely a
nonstarter, see Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (dismissing a
similar hypothetical extension of Shelley), and would also set a difficult standard for police, who
may not know when witnesses are racially biased.
8
E.g., Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased Policing, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 140, 141-43 (2010) (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds. 2010);
Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 164-66;
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442-43 (1997); Evan
7
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frustration: the Court has avoided squarely deciding whether the Equal
Protection Clause bars racial profiling and has meanwhile foreclosed
Fourth Amendment strategies. Moreover, lower courts have been
unwilling to second-guess police reliance on race-specific suspect
identifications, even in extreme cases. 9 Still, as I show here, broader
equal protection doctrine leaves little ambiguity. Racial profiling (by
which I mean reliance on conscious or subconscious racial
generalizations about criminality, as opposed to specific suspect
identifications) clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause as the
Court has consistently interpreted it in other cases outside the policing
context. 10 It is even more obvious that it would be unconstitutional for
police to discriminate on the basis of some other type of racial bias
unrelated to crime prevention aims, so I will focus on the racial
profiling issue here.
Scholars examining the relevant constitutional doctrine have
mainly focused on the Court's numerous adverse Fourth Amendment
precedents. 11 These include Whren v. United States, 12 which held that a
traffic stop provides probable cause for a vehicle search even if the
traffic violation was a mere pretext, and United States v. BrignoniPonce, 13 which suggested that Mexican appearance might provide
reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation when combined with
other factors, but not alone. These cases were indeed big setbacks for
those challenging racial profiling, but they do not directly implicate
equal protection claims. Brignoni-Ponce sent a confusing signal (why
suggest that ethnicity may be relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis

Gerstman & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces of Strict Scrutiny, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 46--50
(2001); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1006 (2010); Meaghan Paulhamus et al., State of the Science in
Racial Profiling Research, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 239, 242-43.
9
Notoriously, in Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit
upheld the interrogation of 200 black men based on a white victim's description of a black male
assailant. For critiques, see Gerstman & Shortell, supra note 8, at 47; Alschuler, supra note 8, at
179-92. However, courts do consistently distinguish the use of race in specific suspect descriptions
from using race to make behavioral generalizations about broad groups. See R. Richard Banks,
Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1075, 1078-80 (2001) (critiquing this distinction).
10
The Sixth Circuit has gotten this issue wrong, however. E.g., United States v. Travis, 62
F. 3d 170, 174 (6th 1995); see Alschuler, supra note 8, at 178-79 (critiquing this and other cases).
11
E.g., Jones-Brown & Maule, supra note 8, at 140-57; Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops
and Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 309, 312-13;
Johnson, supra note 8, at 1006--08.
12
517 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1996).
13
422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563
(1976) (holding that the authority of police to consider Mexican ancestry is greater during stops
made at checkpoints than during roving stops).
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if its consideration is barred by the Fourteenth?), but that possible
signal does not trump the more directly relevant equal protection
precedents striking down decision-makers' use of race even when it is
combined with other factors. 14 Many scholars have critiqued the
doctrinal separation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment objections
to racial profiling, 15 but the upside of this approach is that adverse
Fourth Amendment holdings do not decide the Fourteenth Amendment
issue.l 6
The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether racial
profiling by the police violates the Equal Protection Clause, but to say
that it does not, it would have to upend decades of doctrine. The key
line of cases has arisen in contexts outside policing, but its principles
are directly applicable. It concerns the prohibition of "statistical
discrimination." When applying heightened scrutiny, the Supreme
Court
has
consistently
held
that
otherwise-impermissible
discrimination cannot be justified based on group generalizations, even
if those generalizations are empirically accurate. Instead, individuals
must be treated as individuals.l 7
For example, in Craig v. Boren, 18 the Court struck down a law
establishing different minimum drinking ages for men and women. It
was unmoved by studies showing that young men drove drunk at ten
times the rate of young women, because these findings lumped all
young men together. Similarly, the Court has struck down
governmental reliance on gendered or racial generalizations about
learning styles, 19 juror voting, 20 and workforce participation. 21 All these

14

E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
E.g., Alschuler, supra note 8, at 193 (reviewing commentary); David A. Sklansky, Traffic
Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 30915

29 (1997).
16
Scholars have suggested that Whren and related cases green-light racial profiling in car
searches. See Jones-Brown & Maule, supra note 8, at 153-57 (also citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408 (1997) and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)); Fagan et al., supra note
11, at 312; Paulhamus et al., supra note 8, at 242-43. This is likely often true in practice, because
it was a huge blow to Fourth Amendment claims. But while declining in the Fourth Amendment
context to dig into police's true motives, Whren did not suggest it would be legal to rely on race-it
suggested otherwise. 517 U.S. at 813 ("[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment").
17
See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 823-29 (2014) (analyzing these cases).
18
429
190, 202-04 (1976).
19
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996).
20
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 90, 97-98 (1986).
21
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690-91 (1973).

u.s.

485]

TESTING RACIAL PROFILING

491

generalizations had statistical support, but the Court made clear that
this doesn't matter: basing disparate treatment on groups' typical
tendencies is unfair to atypical individuals within the group. The Court
has carved out exceptions only for physical sex differences relating to
pregnancy. 22 It has never made exceptions for generalizations about
behavior, and it would be shocking if it did so for racial generalizations
about criminal tendencies.
This line of cases should be fatal to the most likely constitutional
defense of racial profiling, namely the claim that profiles are
empirically supported and thus facilitate the police objective of
preventing crime. This is so even assuming crime prevention is a
compelling state interest. 23 In none of the cases reviewed above did the
Court assess whether the statistical generalization in question
established an important government interest. Rather, the prohibition
on statistical discrimination is best understood to constrain the kinds of
reasoning that the government can offer to establish its interest.
Otherwise, the law in Boren might well have survived scrutiny, for
example. The government clearly has an important interest in
preventing drunk driving-yet it was barred from using statistical
evidence to show a relationship between that interest and the gender
classification.
In any event, law enforcement bodies have generally agreed that
racial profiling is illegal. For example, in 2003, the U.S. Department of
Justice declared it "absolutely prohibited." 24 The remaining ambiguity
in the case law may therefore be irrelevant in practice. Modern police
departments do not defend racial profiling. They deny that they engage

22
See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001). Note that, while race-based
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, gender-based classifications are subject to an
intermediate standard of review due to "enduring" physical differences between men and women.
Virginia, 518 U.S at 533.
23
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (listing prohibition on gender generalizations and a
substantial relationship to important government interests as separate requirements).
24
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING 3 (2003), http://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2003/J une/racial_profiling_fact_sheet. pdf [https: //perma.ccMTQR6-GHJ3]. A 2014
guidance qualifies this prohibition under limited circumstances for national-security-related
screenings, in particular when looking for persons suspected to be associated with a particular
terrorist or criminal organization "whose membership has been identified as overwhelmingly"
being of a particular race. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY 2 (2014), https: //www.justice.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/ag I
pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf [https: //perma.cc /R8RC- ELQU]. However, the
guidance explains that even in this context officers must avoid "invidious profiling" and must
instead rely on specific "trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or time frame"-for
example, reliable information that members of a "foreign ethnic insurgent group" are planning a
suicide bombing targeting the president of that foreign country during a state visit. Id. at 9-10.
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in it. 25 Settlements in racial profiling lawsuits frequently contain terms
prohibiting "any consideration of race."26
If the Fourteenth Amendment argument is doctrinally wellsupported and not in practice contested, why do litigants routinely not
win Fourteenth Amendment challenges? And why has the Fourth
Amendment played a more prominent role in profiling litigation? The
key reason is evidentiary: it is very hard for litigants to prove racial
profiling. 27 Individual criminal defendants raising selectiveenforcement defenses face especially steep hurdles. 28 In federal
criminal cases, just getting discovery is notoriously difficult. 29 Even if
defendants can show a broad pattern of discrimination, they must also
show that it affected their cases specifically. Statistical evidence almost

25

E.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing Arizona sheriff's
defense to equal protection suit: "[d]efendants do not engage in racial profiling"); PBS NewsHour,
(PBS broadcast Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/nation-july-dec13-stopfrisk_08-13/
[https://perma.cc/JAZS-CVVS] (quoting NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly: "We do not engage
in racial profiling. It is prohibited by law [and] by our own regulations."); Greg Risling, Associated
Press, DOJ Finds 2 LA Sheriff's Stations Discriminating, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (June 28, 2013),
http: //www .sandiegouniontribune.com/news/20 13/j un/28/ doj-finds- 2-la -sheriffs-stationsdiscriminating/ [https://perma.ccNP7R-K8CC] (quoting L.A. Sheriff Department spokeswoman
Steve Whitmore: "We stand resolute that we have not discriminated against members of the
public[.]"); Jane Prendergast, Officers' Hearts Hold Racial Profiling Solution, Chief Says, CIN.
ENQUIRER (Mar. 6, 2001), http: //enquirer.com/editions/2001103/06/loc_officers_hearts_hold.html
[https://perma.cc/8QZG-WXUD] (quoting Cincinnati police chief: Profiling "is not only wrong, it's
unconstitutional. It's illegal. We know that. We teach that."); Sho Wills, Chicago, New York
Officers Spar Over Stop-and-Frisk Policy, CNN (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/
us/new-york-chicago-stop-frisk/ [https://perma.cc/FDW6-4933] (quoting Chicago Police Department
spokesman Adam Collins: "[W]e don't engage in racial profiling."); Letter from S.C. Kitchen,
Defense Attorney, to Assistant U.S. Attorney General Thomas E. Perez (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www .timesnewshosting.com/docs/johnson.pdf
[https: //perma.cc/P8FF -49YF]
(denying
allegations that Terry Johnson, Sheriff of Alamance County, had engaged in racial profiling).
26
See Sam R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Profiling and Drug Interdiction on
the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 741-43 (2002).
27
See id. at 653--57, 741; Johnson, supra note 8, at 1063--64; David Rudovsky, Law
Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without
Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 322-29 (2001); Sklansky, supra note 15, at 326 ("[C]hallenges to
discriminatory police practices will fail without proof of conscious racial animus on the part of the
police .... [T]his amounts to saying that they will almost always fail.").
28
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Supreme Court denied a
motion for discovery on a selective prosecution claim because plaintiff failed to show that
"similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."); see also RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 354 (1997) ("Research has uncovered no cases" of
convictions overturned for selective prosecution, as of that date.).
29
The Supreme Court has required "some evidence" of "differential treatment of similarly
situated members of other races." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465--67. Armstrong addressed a claim of
selective prosecution, and the Supreme Court has never specifically held that it applies to
disparate-policing cases; in my view, it should not. Identifying a "similarly situated" group is likely
especially difficult in policing cases: police keep no "records of instances in which they could have
stopped a motorist ... but did not." Davis, supra note 8, at 438.

485]

TESTING RACIAL PROFILING

493

never clears this hurdle alone, though it might help m combination
with case-specific qualitative evidence. 30
For these reasons, the best prospects for equal protection
challenges to succeed are in civil cases (class actions or government
enforcement actions), in which the pattern of discrimination is the
issue. Such cases can and have succeeded, and have had important
consequences for police practices; the Floyd v. City of New York 31
litigation, which helped to bring about the New York Police
Department's (NYPD) massive reduction in stop-and-frisk practices, is
a recent example. 32 Such claims turn centrally on statistical evidence.
Other Policy Reasons to Measure Police Disparate Treatment

B.

Some commentators, while acknowledging the legal importance of
the disparate-treatment question, have dismissed its moral importance.
David Thacher, for example, describes the focus on "racial profiling" as
a parochial concern of lawyers-a distraction from "substantive"
equality. 33 Other critics have dismissed the focus on intentional
discrimination as "legalistic." 34 Moreover, beyond the policing context,

30

In principle, strong statistical evidence could allow an inference that the defendant
probably would not have been stopped but for race; this would be the logical inference if a
defendant's race made him more than twice as likely to be stopped. But courts have resisted this
sort of reasoning, see Harcourt, supra note 2, at 1278, just as they are often uncomfortable
inferring individual causation from statistics in other kinds of cases. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial
by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1349-51 (1971).
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court refused to allow a defendant's challenge to
his capital sentence to rest solely on statistical findings of racial disparity in death penalty
administration. This holding emphasized deference to prosecutors and juries, and could possibly
be distinguished in a challenge to police racial profiling; in some other criminal-law contexts
where equal protection claims were made, the Court has been more receptive to statistical
evidence of discrimination. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545 (1967).
31
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
32
It is hard to disentangle the relative influence of the Floyd lawsuit from that of broader
changes in politics and police department policy, especially because the highly public lawsuit and
the evidence of disparities that plaintiffs provided may have shaped the politics of the stop-andfrisk debate. After Mayor DeBlasio's election, the City dropped its appeal and agreed to a threeyear monitoring plan in early 2014. Ray Sanchez et a!., New York Drops Appeal of Controversial
Stop-and-Frisk Ruling, CNN (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/30/us/new-york-dropsstop-frisk-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/H3AR-VBVA]. Stop-and-frisk rates, already declining during
the period the lawsuit was pending, continued to decline sharply, and in 2015 they were an
estimated ninety-six percent below their peak in 2011. See Stop-and-Frisk Down, Safety Up,
NYCLU (Dec. 10, 2015), http: //www.nyclu.org/news/stop-and-frisk-down-safety-nyclu-dataanalysis [https: //perma.cc/QGR8-GGPZ].
33
David Thacher, From Racial Profiling to Racial Equality 1-2 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript) http: //fordschool. umich.ed u/research/pa pers/PD Ffiles/02-006. pdf [https: //perma.cc I
X2CF-49KK].
34
Robin S. Engel, A Critique of the 'Outcome Test' in Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1,
5-9 (2008). This and some similar critiques, however, seem to caricature the "legalistic"
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legal scholars have also long critiqued the focus on colorblindness,
arguing that equality law should primarily target group subordination,
not forbidden classifications. 35 On this view, use of racial classifications
may be appropriate if they are invoked for a purpose that helps to
promote substantive equality-the proper objective is not to be blind to
race, but rather to acknowledge and seek to reduce racial stratification.
From this perspective, a focus on disparate treatment discrimination
can be critiqued for the narrowness of its inquiry, and for its embrace of
a "colorblindness" objective that-in other contexts-has been an
obstacle to race-conscious efforts to promote a more substantive vision
of racial equality.
I generally sympathize with this anti-subordination view. But
racially disparate treatment by police is still worth worrying about and
measuring, and not just for the practical reason that current equal
protection doctrine demands it. Whether the police racially
discriminate is not "merely" a legalistic concern. Racially disparate
treatment adds a substantively meaningful dimension of harm
(exacerbating substantive racial inequality), as well as a distinct target
for policy interventions.
Critics of racial disparities in policing have emphasized the role of
discrimination, "racial profiling," or just "racism." 36 This framing ought
not to be dismissed as mere legalism; it is not only coming from lawyers
and is not usually centrally motivated by legal doctrine. Rather, it has

perspective, confusing the normative claim that disparate treatment matters (and is worth
measuring) with the empirical claim that such disparate treatment is necessarily at the root of all
observed disparities. For example, Pickerill et al. seem to suggest that legal scholars who focus on
racially disparate treatment assume "race is the sole factor that causes police to search motorists."
J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate
Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL'y 1, 2 (2009). Engel likewise claims that "the legalistic
perspective" assumes away racial differences in crime rates and assumes racial profiling is always
ineffective. Engel, supra, at 7. Both claim that such legal scholars believe raw disparities are never
normatively justified. Id. at 9; Pickerill et al., supra, at 5. But such claims are not common in legal
literature, and none are "legalistic"; the law makes it hard to infer discrimination from disparity.
It is perfectly consistent to critique disparate treatment while recognizing that other factors also
contribute to disparities. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 149-51.
35
E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) ("Antisubordination
theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of
pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and practices that
enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups.").
36
E.g., The Targeting of Young Blacks by Law Enforcement: Ben Jealous in Conversation
with Jamelle Bouie, AM. PROSPECT (Fall 2014), http: //prospect.org /article/targeting-young-blackslaw-enforcement-ben-jealous-conversation-jamelle-bouie
[https: //perma.cc/64C8-LYRH];
Rockeymoore et al., supra note 4; Press Release, Rep. John Lewis on Shooting of Michael Brown
and Events in Ferguson, Missouri (Aug. 14, 2014), http://johnlewis.house.gov/press-release/repjohn -lewis-shooting-michael-brown -and -events-ferguson- missouri [https: //perma.cc IN C9S-W8MB].
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cultural resonance and moral force. 37 The harms of racially disparate
policing are thus often substantially amplified by a sense of racial
targeting. Perceptions of police racism also deeply undercut trust in the
police in black communities, which may undermine police
effectiveness. 38 In short, racially disparate treatment may be just one
morally troubling cause of racial disparity, but it is an important one. 39
The particular harms associated with racially disparate treatment
are, if anything, amplified by the purported justification that implicitly
or explicitly underlies it, namely generalizations about racial groups'
crime rates. For the government to generalize that people of color are
dangerous, and to specifically target them on that basis for surveillance
and arrest, is expressively and morally noxious, especially because such
generalizations have a painful history in our culture. 40 I am not
suggesting that one should not acknowledge racial differences in crime
rates where they exist. What is poisonous is using those differences to
justify ignoring differences within groups, making law-abiding citizens
"pay for fears generated by criminals with whom they are lumped by
dint of color." 41 This expressive harm is part of the distinctive injury
done by racial profiling specifically.
Moreover, it is practically useful to disentangle police disparate
treatment from other causes of policing disparities, even if one views
those other causes as normatively problematic as well. Teasing out
different causes of disparity can help guide policy responses. For
example, many police departments have recently invested effort in
implicit-bias testing and training, an approach that assumes that
policing disparity is at least partially grounded in the assumptions
37

See REBECCA M. BLANK ET AL., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 103 (2004) (stating
more generally that "the broader public vision of what discrimination means [is] the treatment of
two (nearly) identical people differently").
38
See KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 151-53; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 84, 102-04; Weitzer & Tuch,
supra note 3, at 1017-18.
39
To be sure, a "colorblind" policing objective could sometimes interfere with efforts to
achieve other equality objectives, including equality conditional on criminal conduct. For example,
if certain stop criteria are less predictive of guilt for one race than another, police might have to
take race into account when interpreting them if they want to avoid imposing racially disparate
impacts. I do not seek to resolve these dilemmas here, although my own leaning would be to
permit race-conscious efforts to avoid disparate impacts, favoring a more substantive view of
equality. The current Supreme Court might not agree, however. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
557 (2009) (casting doubt on the constitutionality of race-conscious efforts to avoid disparate
impact liability).
40
See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 16; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the
Messenger, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1987); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on Trayvon Martin (July 19, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvon- martin [https: //perma.cc/82B5- N7 AC].
41
KENNEDY, supra note 28, at xi.
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officers make about people of color. 42 Empirical estimates of disparatetreatment discrimination could help to motivate this and other
interventions that seek to alter police decision-making processes. On
the other hand, to the extent that such analyses show that policing
disparities are substantially grounded in other causes, they will help to
warn us that interventions that merely seek "color-blind policing" may
prove disappointingly unable to eliminate those disparities. In that
case, alternative or additional policy interventions may be called for,
and I discuss a couple of examples in the next Section.
C.

Distinguishing the Estimation of Disparate Treatment from Other
Objectives of Policing-Disparity Research

Although estimation of disparate treatment by police is a
worthwhile objective for empiricists, it is not the only worthwhile
objective, and it bears emphasis that there are many normatively
important sources of racial disparity in policing that this concept does
not encompass. Several other conceptions of racial inequality in
policing have been and should be the focus of empirical inquiry as well.
For readers who are attempting to make sense of seemingly conflicting
statistics concerning race and policing, it is important to clarify that
not every study is attempting to measure the same thing. That is,
different studies either implicitly or explicitly conceptualize racial
inequality in different ways-some of which are quite different from
disparate treatment discrimination. Here, I identify a few key
examples.
1. Raw racial disparity.

First, estimating disparate treatment is a narrower and much
more difficult task than estimating raw racial disparities in police
interactions. Raw disparity statistics entail simple comparisons across
racial groups of the per capita rates of police interactions, or, similarly,
comparisons of a group's population share to its share of police
interactions. Such statistics have played an important role in debates
about race and policing, including some empirical studies, 43 some legal
scholarship, 44 and a large share of media coverage. 45 For example, one
42

Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, 78 POLICE CHIEF 44 (2011).
E.g., Jeff Rojek et al., The Influence of Driver's Race on Traffic Stops in Missouri, 7 POLICE
Q. 126 (2004).
44
E.g., Bennet Cappers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (2011); Johnson, supra note 8; Floyd
Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of Laws:
In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 724 n.9 (2004).
43
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recent study found: "Blacks were subjected to 63% of [pedestrian stops],
even though they made up just 24% of Boston's population." 46
Raw disparities are easy enough to measure, so long as police
departments collect data about the police interaction in question and
the demographics of those subjected to it. Such data are available on a
national scale for arrests, but are only available in some jurisdictions
for other interactions such as stops, searches, and use of force. This
data shortcoming is a readily soluble problem, requiring only political
will and commitment of some resources, and there is currently a
significant effort funded by the U.S. Department of Justice to build a
national database on stops and use of force. 47 Raw disparities are
comparatively easy to estimate because, properly understood, they
entail no causal claims and do not require measuring difficult-toobserve variables such as crime commission or suspicious behavior.
As critics often point out, identifying the existence of raw
disparities does not tell us the reasons for them, and in particular does
not prove police racial discrimination. But raw disparity statistics are
very importapt for other purposes; most obviously, they demonstrate
that people of color disproportionately bear the burdens of our criminal
justice system and its expansion in recent decades. And while policing
can obviously also bring benefits to communities, the burdens it
imposes are substantial. Interacting with police is often stressful and
scary, 48 and even if no charges are brought, arrest records can produce
stigma, job-market consequences, and increased sentences in future
cases. 49 If charges and punishment are pursued, the consequences of
police interactions are obviously even greater, and much of the racial
disparity in U.S. incarceration rates can be explained by disparate

45

E.g., Jess Bidgood, Boston Police Focus on Blacks in Disproportionate Numbers, Study
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/us/boston-police-focus-onblacks-in -disproportionate-numbers-study-shows.html?_r=1 [https: 1/perma.ccnYVG-YYER]; see
Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 180, 181 (describing the "compulsion in media reports"
to focus on per-capita racial disparities in police stops).
46
ACLU, supra note 2, at 1.
47
Nation's First Police Profiling Database Awarded Grant By NSF, CTR. FOR POLICING
EQUITY (Nov. 7, 2013), http: 1/policingequity.org /wp-content/uploads/2013/12/database_release
_final. pdf [https: 1/perma.cc /XW8B-ZJLK].
48
See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 212-13; Rod K. Brunson, Beyond Stop Rates: Using
Qualitative Methods to Examine Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING,
supra note 8, at 221, 224-33.
49
See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/asarrest-records-rise-americans-find -consequences-can -last-a -lifetime-1408415402
[https: //perma.cc/H2TE-69C5].
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arrest rates. 50 These burdens are not merely borne by the guiltyespecially the burdens of stops and searches, most of which produce no
evidence of wrongdoing. 51
Empirical research on raw disparities can add to our
understanding of these burdens. And it provides an essential starting
point for any further empirical assessment of why those disparities
exist, and for a policy assessment of what can be done about them.
Disparity research can motivate policy changes within the criminal
justice system as well as broader changes outside of it, such as social
policies addressing poverty and other root causes of crime-rate
disparities.
2. Other criminal justice policies and practices that shape racial
disparities.
Second, if researchers seek to go beyond simply measuring
disparities, and identify causes of those disparities that can be
addressed via changes to criminal justice policies, disparate treatment
discrimination is not the only such cause that should be of interest.
Rather, researchers can shed light on the racially disparate impacts of
facially race-neutral policy choices, including the ways we define
crimes, grade their severity, and apportion enforcement resources.
Such studies have been relatively uncommon, but one example is Golub
et al.'s study of NYPD's massive increase in marijuana enforcement
during the 1990s; the authors show that this change very
disproportionately affected black and Latino New Yorkers. 52 This
disproportionate effect might or might not have been the product of
police discrimination in the disparate treatment sense-Golub et al. did
not seek to answer this question. But regardless of the answer, the
choice to prioritize marijuana enforcement in the first place was a
choice-one that did not have to be made, and could be reversedwhich had strongly racially disparate consequences.
50
See, e.g., Brett E. Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality in the American Prison
Population, 5 JUST. POL'y J. 1, 14-25 (2008) (reviewing literature); Alfred Blumstein, Racial
Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743 (1993) (In 1991,

seventy-six percent of the black-white incarceration gap stemmed from arrest.). Black
incarceration rates are about six times the white rate. One in nine black men under age thrity-five
is incarcerated. JENIFER WARREN ET. AL., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN
AMERICA 2008 3, 6 (Feb. 2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-lmediallegacy/uploadedfiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg /reports/sentencing_and_corrections/onein 1OOpdf. pdf
[https: //perma.cc /A25FKHLL].
51
See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 36, 49.
52
Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnic Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in
New York City, 6 CRIM. & PuB. POL'y 131, 137 (2007).
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3. Racial disparity unexplained by crime.

Often, efforts to explain policing disparities empirically assess only
one explanatory variable other than race: crime commission. That is,
researchers as well as lawyers, courts, and other commentators often
ask: are racial disparities in stops, arrests, and other policing statistics
explained by racial disparities in crime commission? These
comparisons, which are made routinely by both defenders and critics of
police departments, often take the form of comparing a racial group's
share of crimes to its share of police interactions ("share comparisons"),
with crime measured according to some benchmark such as police
reports or survey data. 53 Alternatively, they sometimes take the form of
comparing, across racial groups, the ratio of police interaction rates to
crime rates ("ratio comparisons"). 54
In another paper, I offer an extensive critique of these sorts of
comparisons, which often dramatically overstate crime's explanatory
role by ignoring the fact that not all those who are subjected to police
interactions are guilty.55 If researchers want to assess whether criminal
conduct explains policing disparity, "share comparisons" and "ratio
comparisons" will be distorted by their failure to account for
interactions with the innocent. 56 There are plausible alternative
approaches, including regression analyses that include both race and
some measure of criminal conduct as regressors. I consider challenges
associated with this kind of analysis in Part II.A.
In any event, these simple three-variable comparisons (police
interaction rates, race, crime), even if constructed in a more sensible'
way, should usually not be interpreted as estimates of police racial
discrimination. The question of whether people with similar criminal

53

See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime
and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 328 (1997) (comparing fifty-six
percent black robbery suspect share to sixty-one percent arrest share); Stacey Patton, If You're
White, That Joint Probably Won't Lead to Jail Time, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2014),
https: //www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-youre-white· that-joint· probably· wont-lead-to-jailtime/2014/0 1110/caa94154-77f8-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_story .html [https: //perma.cc/3TAE-N8PT]
(comparing fourteen percent black drug-user share to thirty-four percent drug-arrest and fiftythree percent drug-incarceration shares).
54
See, e.g., BLANKET AL., supra note 37, at 193 (comparing eighteen percent black speeding
share to seventy-three percent search share).
55
See generally Sonja Starr, Race and Policing: How to Make Sense of the Numbers (And How
Not to), Working Paper (on file with author), Part I; For additional commentary on this approach,
seeR. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2006); JeffDominitz, How Do the Laws of Probability Constrain Legislative and
Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial Profiling?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 412, 414 (2003).
56
See generally Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical
Challenges Part II (Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 15-003, Jan. 19, 2015).
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conduct are treated similarly by police may be morally important in its
own right, and worthy of empirical estimation; I discuss the reasons
this is so in my other paper. 57 But it is generally not the same as the
disparate-treatment question, and it is not the focus of this piece. For
the purpose of estimating racially disparate treatment, crime is one
important potentially confounding variable, but not necessarily the
only one. "Accounting for crime" alone might lead to either an
overestimate or an underestimate of police racial discrimination,
depending on which way other unobserved variables cut.
For this reason, in Part II.A, I assume that observational
assessments of police discrimination will usually also seek to account
for other variables. However, it may be reasonable to treat crime as the
only relevant confounding variable in one (fairly common) situation:
where the police themselves argue that policing disparities are
explained by crime differences, and offer no additional explanations.
Then, the analysis can be seen as testing whether the department's
explanation holds up.
4. Irrational or "taste-based" discrimination.
While disparate-treatment discrimination is a relatively narrow
way to conceptualize policing inequality, an even narrower conception
underlies one common approach to the estimation of policing disparity.
This approach compares across races the "hit rates" of police
interactions-usually, the rate at which stops lead to arrests, which is
taken as a proxy for guilt. Assuming police are motivated to maximize
the number of arrests, equal hit rates across races are interpreted to
show that police are considering race "rationally"; unequal hit rates
imply irrational "taste-based" discrimination. Hit-rate models dominate
the economic literature on policing disparities. 58 Elsewhere, I have
critiqued these models on a number of fronts, arguing that they rely on
faulty empirical assumptions and make wrong predictions. 59
57

Id.

58

The seminal paper is John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory
and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001); see also Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Generalizing the

Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in
Wichita, 116 ECON. J. F351 (2006); Ruben Hernandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or
Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 959 (2004); Nicola Persico,
Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1472, 1479 (2002); cf.
GARY 8. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 140-42 (1996) (providing the central insight that
"tastes for discrimination" are generally not efficient to discriminators).
59
Starr, supra note 55, at Part II. For additional criticism, see also Harcourt, supra note 2, at
1295-1314 (criticizing the economic models of racial profiling because (1) the models incorrectly
define "success" as maximizing the total number of arrests, and (2) the models assume that the
official criminal rates are a good proxy for real offending rates).
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Here, however, I will simply observe that estimating "taste-based"
discrimination is not the same as estimating racially disparate
treatment. The theory underlying hit-rate models distinguishes tastebased discrimination from statistical discrimination (use of race as a
proxy for a legitimate consideration with which it is correlated-here,
criminality). Hit-rate models assume that racially unbiased police will
consider race when assessing how suspicious somebody is-that is, the
likelihood of criminality-if indeed there are racial differences in crime
rates. Economists sometimes defend statistical discrimination as
efficient, although the conditions under which it is so have been much
debated. 60
But as discussed in Section A, U.S. constitutional law draws no
distinction between racially disparate treatment that is grounded in
statistical generalizations and racially disparate treatment that is
grounded in mere preference or prejudice. Both are components of
unconstitutional discrimination, and so an approach that measures
only the latter will be underinclusive, even assuming other empirical
concerns can be set aside. For this reason, I do not include the hit-rate
studies in Part II's review of methods of estimating police
discrimination: they are unsuited to the task at hand.
D.

On Race and Causation

Estimates of disparate-treatment discrimination are estimates of
causal effects, not mere correlations-specifically, the causal effect of
citizens' race (or of the racial compositions of communities) on police
decision-making. 61 But identifying causal effects of race is challenging
in practice and perhaps conceptually as well, because race is not a
"treatment" subject to manipulation. Its effects are intertwined with
each individual's other attributes and life experiences-which may
themselves have been influenced by race. Scholars have therefore
debated whether the language of causal inference can be meaningfully
applied to race at all. 62 Perhaps we cannot sensibly ask how a person's

60
See Peter Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 615
(2003); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659
(1972) (providing a seminal theoretical account); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination
Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228 (1986).
61
See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and
Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. Soc. 299, 302 (2006) (defining "discrimination" as "the causal effect
of race").
62
D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable
Characteristics, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 775, 783-84 (2011); Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Race as a
Bundle of Sticks: Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics, 19 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 499 (2016).
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outcome would have differed but for her race if her entire life would
have been different in that counterfactual. 63
This conceptual hurdle is not insuperable, however. Usually, when
we ask causal questions about racial discrimination, we are not asking
about the lifelong effects of race, but rather about discrimination in a
particular decision process (e.g., arrest). The counterfactual is how the
decision-maker would have responded had she encountered a person of
a different race whose relevant characteristics (as perceived by the
officer) were otherwise similar. To assess this question, it does not
really matter how or why the individual developed those observable
characteristics, and in particular whether race affected the likelihood of
his doing so. This counterfactual analysis need not entail imagining, for
example, a "white version" of a black citizen, identical in all ways but
race. It entails merely comparing the way police treat people with
similar observable and decision-relevant characteristics-for example,
white and black drivers who are driving the same speed on a given
highway.
James Greiner and Donald Rubin have suggested referring to
"perceived race" to highlight the fact that we are talking about the
decision-maker's perspective. 64 Another way (slightly clearer, in my
view) is to say that we are assessing the "effects of police racial
discrimination," if police are the decision-makers of interest. In any
event, though, I think there is not much harm in the shorthand "effect
of race," provided we are clear on what it means. Note that if one did
want to examine "the effect of dynamic, cumulative discrimination"
throughout a person's life (and, even further back, the life of his family
and community), the strategies discussed in the next Part would not
much help, but raw disparity estimates might. 65
Moreover, in my view, it is not only conceptually possible to assess
the effects of racial perceptions on police treatment of individual
communities; it is important to do so, for reasons outlined in Sections A
and B above. Of course, we should think about race as "causing"
policing disparities through multiple channels, of which police racial
discrimination is just one. When we estimate disparate treatment
discrimination by police, we should remember that components of racial
63
Issa Kahler-Hausmann made such an argument at this Symposium. Policing the Police:
The 2015 Legal Forum Symposium, U. OF CHIC. LEGAL F. (Nov. 6, 2015), https:/llegalforum. uchicago.edu/page/symposium [https: //perma.cc/B6TQ-G EAL]; see also Iss a KahlerHausmann, Detecting Discrimination In Policing (Or, The Dangers of Counterfactual Causal
Thinking . . .), BALKINIZATION (Aug. 13, 2015), http:/lbalkin.blogspot.com/2015/08/detectingdiscrimination-in-policing -or .html [https: //perma.cc /EXE8-5BSE].
64
Greiner & Rubin, supra note 62, at 775.
65
BLANKET AL., supra note 37, at 225-27.
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disparity that appear to be explained by other "race-neutral" variables
may ultimately be the product of the many other ways racial
discrimination has divided and constructed our society. 56
Beyond these conceptual issues, there remain practical challenges
associated with causal inference about the "effects of race" even in the
narrower sense of discrimination by a particular decision-maker. A key
problem is that unlike other "treatments" that social scientists study,
race does not vary for any given individual, and is thus hard to
disentangle from other characteristics. Immutable traits generally defy
observational researchers' best tools for causal inference, such as quasiexperiments exploiting shocks to a treatment. Instead, researchers
must use methods-such as regression, reweighting, and matchingthat share a core limitation: their ability to support causal inferences
depends on the assumption that the only relevant confounding
variables are those the researchers observe and include in the model.
Because omitted variable bias is always possible, careful researchers
often refer to the race gaps that remain after controlling for observed
variables simply as "unexplained," rather than claiming proof of
discrimination. 67
Fortunately, neither policy analysis nor law requires definitive
answers. For policy purposes, even analyses with weaker causal
identification can help narrow down the possible causes of racial
disparities; theoretically informed discussion can then guide
interpretation of unexplained gaps. In civil litigation, the burden of
proof normally requires that the factfinder believe that the :best
interpretation of the evidence is that discrimination probably had some
effect. Non-statistical evidence of causation is routinely open to
multiple interpretations, and while courts have often demanded more
clarity out of statistical evidence, certainty or even near-certainty is too
much to ask for. 68 Moreover, it should be unnecessary to rule out every
conceivable confounding variable-as suggested above, the question
really should be whether the police department's explanations for
disparities hold up.69
66

See generally Kohler- Hausmann, supra note 63.
See. e.g., Quillian, supra note 61, at 303.
68
The case that set the hardest standard was McCleskey, in which the Supreme Court,
invoking deference to prosecutors and jurors, held that "exceptionally clear proof" of
discrimination was required to support a challenge to the death penalty. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 297 (1987). But it's not obvious that McCleskey's reasoning applies to policing at all, and
it does not apply to civil lawsuits alleging a pattern of discrimination. McCleskey (and every
federal appellate case following it) centers on the problem of inferring discrimination in an
individual criminal case from a broader statistical pattern.
69
In petit and grand jury discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has required the state to
articulate reasons for its decisions and "stand or fall on the plausibility" of those reasons. Miller- El
67
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In the remainder of this discussion, I assume that strong causal
identification is the ideal goal of research on police racial
discrimination, and this assumption drives the new proposal that I
outline in Part III. However, in Part II, I also examine what we can
learn from observational research that falls somewhat short of this
goal.
II. ASSESSING CURRENT EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
In this Part, I assess leading current empirical approaches to the
assessment of police racial discrimination. First, I consider the use of
regression or similar observational methods to try to isolate the effects
of such discrimination by accounting for alternative explanations for
policing disparities. Section A evaluates the (limited) utility of such
methods to assess individual-level discrimination in initial police stops;
Section B considers their use to assess neighborhood-level
discrimination in stops, which is generally somewhat easier; and
Section C addresses regression analyses of post-stop outcomes. In
Section D, I look at a small but promising body of quasi-experimental
research that seeks to exploit variations in decision-makers' ability to
perceive race-an approach that, under certain assumptions, obviates
the necessity to observe crime and other potential confounders. Finally,
in Section E, I assess lab-experimental work on implicit racial bias,
which provides strong causal identification of one psychological
mechanism for police discrimination, but does not directly assess realworld disparities in treatment.

A.

Individual-Level Analyses of Racial Disparities in Stops

Suppose you wanted to conduct a regression analysis to assess
potential explanations for racial disparities in a city's police stop
rates-in particular, you want to know whether those disparities
persist even after controlling for plausible race-neutral explanations.
Ideally, what kind of data would you need to carry out the analysis, and
what would you do with it? This is an instructive thought exercise to
begin with before we turn to the less-than-ideal data sources that
observational researchers actually have.
It is useful to think about racial disparity in policing as having two
key dimensions: disparities among neighborhoods with different racial
compositions, and disparities in the treatment of individuals within
neighborhoods. Assuming policing varies across neighborhoods, any
v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005); see Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1970) (holding
that this burden·shifting can be triggered by statistical evidence of disparate impact).
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given individual's stop probability may be affected both by the
neighborhood he is in and by his own characteristics and behaviors. To
assess the way these components combine to explain a city's overall
racial disparity patterns, one would want an individual-level datasetideally covering a large random sample of individuals in the city-and
you would want it to contain each individual's home address (and
possibly work address), so that you could also include variables for
neighborhood-level characteristics. 70
For each individual in the sample, you would first need to know his
race and whether and how often the police stopped him in the time
period covered. Second, you would need to think about potential raceneutral explanations for stop patterns. Because police typically explain
policing disparities by reference to differences in criminal conduct, you
would want rich data on the individual's behavior over some fixed time
period. You would want to know what crimes the person committed
over the time period, how often, and whether they were committed in
public. You would want to know more generally how much time the
individual spent out in public, potentially subjecting himself to a stop.
The most important behavioral information you would want is how
often the person engaged publicly in behavior that-while not
necessarily criminal-could help to produce reasonable suspicion for a
stop.
Ideally, you would want to break all of this behavioral data down
to a fine-grained temporal level (e.g., person-days or even person-hours)
so that you could estimate the probability of being stopped conditional
on being engaged in crime (or suspicious activity) at that time. You
would also want crime rates at the neighborhood level, since police
typically point to neighborhood crime-rate differences as an explanation
for policing disparities, and since "high crime area" is also a factor that
can contribute to constitutionally reasonable suspicion. 71 Besides crime,
you might also want to disentangle the roles of other individual and
neighborhood differences-for example, to distinguish racial from
socioeconomic discrimination, you might want socioeconomic data about
neighborhoods or individuals.

70

If you wanted to separate out the effect of the individual's race from the effect of
neighborhood racial composition, you'd include both variables separately in the regression.
Leaving the neighborhood-composition variable out would effectively combine the two components.
If you wanted to focus the analysis only on intra-neighborhood disparities, you could control for
what neighborhood each individual is in (neighborhood fixed effects), which effectively controls for
all inter-neighborhood differences simultaneously. However, the use of neighborhood fixed effects
will filter out any police racial discrimination that occurs at the inter-neighborhood level, based on
racial composition.
71
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
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If you had all this information, you could estimate the probability
of being stopped in a given time period conditional on actual criminal
activity, other external indicia of suspiciousness, and the individual's
and neighborhood's fixed characteristics. You could use regression or a
similar method (like matching or reweighting) to estimate the effect of
the individual's race and his neighborhood's racial composition on stop
probability, holding all other factors constant. Such a regression would
effectively control for the variables that police departments typically
point to as explaining policing disparities (plus perhaps other potential
confounders). Although omitted variable bias is always a potential
issue in this kind of analysis, if your dataset were rich enough, it would
be quite plausible to attribute remaining unexplained racial gaps to
police racial discrimination.
The problem is that most policing-disparity researchers do not
have anything remotely approaching this dream data. While some
neighborhood-level information is often available (more on this below),
researchers generally have no access to any individual-level data on a
random sample of the public. Rather, they have data from the criminal
justice system, which covers only individuals the police have interacted
with, and is far more limited in scope. For example, some police
departments require officers to fill out forms documenting every
pedestrian stop. These forms typically include basic demographic
information, location, and the stated reasons for the stop, as well as the
result of the stop (for example, whether an arrest was made). 72 If
researchers can access these forms, they can analyze the racial- and
neighborhood-level distributions of police stops.
But explaining those distributions is much harder. First, the forms
do not give us any objective information about what stopped
pedestrians were doing prior to the stop. The forms tell us only what
the police officers wrote down, which may be a post hoc rationalization
for the stop. In a study of whether stops are discriminatory, it is
certainly not sound to assume that the very police officers being studied
always record pedestrian behavior in an accurate, nondiscriminatory
way. Second, and even more problematically, the forms provide no
information whatsoever about persons who were not stopped by the
police (or, for that matter, information about what the stoppees were
doing at any time in the study period other than the moment they were
stopped). So taken alone, the forms do not facilitate the kind of
individual-level analysis discussed above.

72

See, e.g., Robin S. Engel et al., Citizens' Demeanor, Race, and Traffic Stops, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 287, 289.
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Nor, typically, is there any other available source of individuallevel information about criminal behavior (much less suspicious but
noncriminal behavior) that could be linked to police outcome data. In
terms of public records, at most, one might imagine being able to link
some sort of public database that includes citizens' residences and
demographics with their official criminal records; obtaining access to
even this sort of data would be difficult. In any event, official criminal
records are a rather poor proxy for actual criminality. Mter all, the vast
majority of crimes are never detected and never enter the criminal
justice system. For example, surveys suggest there are hundreds of
millions of drug crimes in the U.S. each year, but only about 1.5 million
drug arrests. 73 Even most reported violent and property crimes go
unsolved. 74 Moreover, even for cases that are in the system, we again
lack objective conduct measures-we know only what people were
arrested for, convicted of, and so forth. But again, these measures may
themselves be affected by police racial bias, and therefore treating
them as conduct measures would introduce a troubling circularity to
the analysis.
For these reasons, researchers have rarely been able to conduct
individual-level analyses of racial disparities in the likelihood of police
interactions conditional on behavior and other potential confounders.
There are, however, a couple of potentially promising ways that
researchers could collect data to support such analyses. First,
researchers could conduct surveys about criminal conduct and police
interactions. A survey could, in principle, ask individuals for much of.. ...
the individual-level information described above. Respondents could
plausibly be expected to provide rough estimates of the amounts of time
each day that they typically spend engaged in various activities, to
recall specific police interactions reasonably accurately, and to describe
their participation m cnmes, including how often they carry
contraband.

73

See OFF. OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'y, FACT SHEET: 2010 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG
USE AND HEALTH (Sept. 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/
nsduh_fact_sheet_9-7-11_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXE9-HP2F] (use rates). For arrest rates, see
Arrest Data Analysis Tool, supra note 1. See also Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http: //www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafetylimpaired_driving I
impaired-drv_factsheet.html [https://perma.cc!SJR7-25Y8] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (finding one
percent arrested out of 112 million self-reported drunk-driving instances each year).
74
Nationally, approximately twenty percent of reported property crimes and forty-five
percent of reported violent crimes are cleared. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, OFFENSES
CLEARED (Fall 2015), https: //www .tbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime· in-the-u.s/20 14/crime-in-the-u.s.20 14/offenses-known-ta-la w -enforcement /clearances/man/clearances. pdf [https: //perma.cc /P88U6KN3].
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A number of large national surveys already collect detailed
information about criminal incidents, including demographic
information. Some surveys, such as the Census Bureau's National
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 75 gather data from victims,
including information on police disposition of incidents. This approach
allows assessment of racial disparities in police response to reported
crimes, but it is not useful for victimless crimes such as drug crimes,
and provides no information about how police respond to individuals
who are not committing crimes. Other surveys ask individuals to selfreport crimes, like drug use 76 (and occasionally drug delivery). 77 Selfreport surveys are potentially a good match for the kinds of analysis
described above, because they produce individual-level samples
including people with no criminal conduct and with no police contacts.
Such surveys do not always also ask about police interactions, but
they could, and some do. A few researchers have used local youthcohort surveys that ask such questions to assess racial and other
disparities. 78 The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)79
asks about the respondent's arrest history in the past year, although
this variable has often been ignored in studies using the data. 80 Useful

75

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (ON BEHALF OF THE BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS), NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2014), http://www .bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs2_2014.pdf [https: //perma.
cc/YF4N-Q27G].
76
See LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, MONITORING THE FUTURE,
NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-2013: VOLUME I, 9 (2014), http://
monitoringthefuture.org 1/pubs/monographs/mtf-voll_20 13. pdf
[https: //perma.cc /D5D7-BSR4];
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND
HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default!files/
NSD UHresultsPD FWHTML20 13!Web/NSD UHresults20 13. pdf
[https: //perma.cc /L9N8-3 7UE].
Drug use surveys find only minor racial differences, which scholars often contrast with large race
gaps in drug arrests. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6-7 (2010); Yonette F.
Thomas, The Social Epidemiology of Drug Abuse, 32 AM. J. PREV. MED. Sl44 (2007); see also
Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. et al., Corrections for Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement, 55 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 1365, 1381-82 (2014) (using surveys on DWis).
77
Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota's Prison
and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 239-40 (2009) (finding somewhat higher drug sales
rates among blacks); KATHERINE BECKETT ET AL., ACLU, RACE AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
SEATTLE 42 (2008) https: //www .aclu.org lfiles/assets/race20and20drug20law20enforcement20in
20seattle_2008l.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX2T-2XDG] (using data on drug delivery from study
conducted at needle exchange).
78
David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45
DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008); Robert J. Sampson, Effects of Socioeconomic Context on Official Reaction
to Juvenile Delinquency, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 876 (1986).
79
See supra note 73.
80
Criminology studies using the NSDUH have usually used its drug use figures as an out-ofsample benchmark to compare other arrest data to. E.g., Holly Nguyen & Peter Reuter, How Risky
Is Marijuana Possession? Considering the Role of Age, Race, and Gender, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 879
(2012). But public health and medical researchers have used the NSDUH arrest data to assess
racial disparities; such research often is not framed in "policing disparity" terms per se (instead
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expansions could include questions about other interactions such as
stops, frisks, and searches; ask more comprehensive questions about
non-drug criminal conduct; and sample persons recently incarcerated
(who are currently excluded, potentially introducing sample selection
bias). 81
Still, there are limitations to this approach. Surveys are expensive,
and the existing large national surveys' samples are not designed to
produce valid local estimates, so collecting information about particular
police departments' practices would require substantial new
undertakings. 82 In addition, crime surveys raise concerns about
accuracy, 83 and these would be exacerbated if they asked for very finegrained information-for example, detailed accounts of each day's
activities. Moreover, even if individuals report actual criminal conduct
accurately, it is unrealistic to expect individuals to accurately selfappraise and remember whether they were at any given time engaging
in "suspicious" conduct-moving "furtively," for instance. Rather than
measuring such factors directly, researchers would realistically have to
rely on an assumption that respondents' reports of actual criminal
conduct are a good proxy for behavior giving rise to reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct-or at least that they are an equally good
proxy across racial groups.
Another possible approach is for researchers to attempt to directly
observe the criminal or suspicious behavior of individuals, as well as
whether police stop them. A few prior policing-disparity studies have at
least sought to observe the former. The seminal example was John
Lamberth's 1994 New Jersey Turnpike study, in which researchers
drove just over the speed limit and observed the drivers who passed
treating arrest as simply a negative health/life outcome). Pacek et a!. find substantial racial
disparities in the probability of arrest conditional on "disordered" marijuana use. Lauren R. Pacek
et a!., Race/Ethnicity Differences Between Alcohol, Marijuana, and Co-Occurring Alcohol and

Marijuana Use Disorders and Their Association with Public Health and Social Problems Using a
National Sample, 21 AM. J. ADDICT. 435, 437 (2012). Burns et a!. use the data to draw share
comparisons between drug buys, drug use, and drug arrests. Rachel M. Burns et a!., Statistics on
Cannabis Users Skew Perceptions of Cannabis Use, 2013 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 4 tbl.2.
81
Under current NSDUH methodology, recently-incarcerated persons are not surveyed,
which may introduce sample selection bias. If black drug arrestees are more likely to be
incarcerated (as many studies indicate), excluding incarcerated persons would downward-bias
estimates of racial disparity in arrest rates.
82
BRIAN WIERSEMA, NATIONAL CONSORTIUM ON VIOLENCE RESEARCH, AREA-IDENTIFIED
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY DATA 1 (1999); Dep't Health and Human Servs.,
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Admin., State Estimates of Substance Abuse from the 200607 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health 7-9 (2009).
83
See BARRY SPUNT, SELF-REPORT SURVEYS, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
1465, 1465-67 (David Levinson ed. 2002); Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Minority Arrest: A
Note on What Has Been Said and How It Fits Together, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 29, 42-45 (1997).
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them. 84 Subsequent highway studies have used radar. 85 Other
researchers have physically observed traffic violations on city streets, 86
or used video cameras in a store to observe shoplifting. 87 In none of
these studies, however, did researchers seek to observe policing
outcomes for the same individuals being observed. That is presumably
because doing so would have massively magnified projects that were
already resource-intensive-police stop only a tiny percentage of
speeders, for instance, so obtaining a sample that provided sufficient
statistical power to study stop outcomes would require having
observers in place for a very long time.
That being said, in some contexts it might be possible to physically
observe all the necessary data for a sufficient sample. For example,
such studies could be carried out at immigration, airport security, or
other law enforcement checkpoints (optimally with the agency's
cooperation). Researchers could record the behavior of individuals
passing through, demographics, whether the individual has
companions, flight origin and destination, number and type of bags,
plus any computer database information that agents observe when they
run the traveler's identification through the system. They could then
record what the agents do: for example, diversion for additional
searches. This approach would be a straightforward expansion of selfstudies that agencies have already carried out. 88
Still, the prospects of this approach are limited to contexts where
both the individual conduct and the police conduct in question are
84

State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 351 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996); JOHN LAMBERTH, REVISED
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENCE OF POLICE STOPS AND ARRESTS OF BLACK
DRIVERS/TRAVELERS ON THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE BETWEEN EXITS OR INTERCHANGES 1 AND 3
FROM THE YEARS 1988 THROUGH 1991 (Nov. 11, 1994).
85
See James E. Lange et al., Testing the Racial Profiling Hypothesis for Seemingly Disparate
Stops on the New Jersey Turnpike, 22 JUST. Q. 193, 211-12 (2005); ROBIN S. ENGEL ET AL.,
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, PROJECT ON POLICE-CITIZEN CONTACTS, YEAR 2 FINAL REPORT (MAY
2003-APRIL 2004) 64-65, 110 (2005).
88
Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Investigating Racial Profiling by the Miami-Dade Police
Department: A Multimethod Approach, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 25, 36, 41-44 (2007) (finding
no unjustified racial disparity in stops).
87
Dean A. Dabney et al., Who Actually Steals? A Study of Covertly Observed Shoplifters, 21
JUST. Q. 693, 711 (2004). One concern about this study is that its analysis confusingly estimates
shoplifting rates after controlling for behaviors (e.g., product-tampering) that seem to be part of
the shoplifting conduct itself.
88
Federal agencies have conducted studies designed to produce benchmarks for comparisons
to agency data on the demographic distribution of persons passing through checkpoint stops.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 196855, ASSESSING MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES FOR
IDENTIFYING RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER: OBSERVATION-BASED DATA COLLECTION IN AIRPORTS
AND AT IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS 1 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/amtireg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QP6A-LMT6]. The border control checkpoint study merely recorded the race of
those passing through (a population benchmark), while the airport security checkpoint study
recorded some additional information such as gender, age, and number of carry-ons.
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expected to take place in known places and times where researchers or
cameras can be stationed. Most crime and most police interactions,
however, are less predictable, and surveys will be the only plausible
source of individual-level data. In practice, given the demands of either
method, we can expect that in most policing contexts, it will remain
very difficult to carry out observational studies of policing disparities
that seek to measure and control for differences in individual behavior.

B.

Neighborhood-Level Analyses

Suppose you had a more limited objective: to assess only the interneighborhood dimension of possible police racial discrimination. Do
police treat neighborhoods of color differently because of their racial
composition? Regression analysis could seek to answer this question by
regressing neighborhood stop rates on measures of racial composition
(for instance, the black population share) as well as plausible
neighborhood-level confounding variables-that is, nonracial reasons
that police might treat different neighborhoods differently.
It is typically possible to construct datasets to support this kind of
analysis, and researchers have done so. An important example was the
study of precinct-level disparities presented by the plaintiffs' expert,
Jeffrey Fagan, in the Floyd stop-and-frisk case against the NYPD. 89
Fagan regressed precinct stop rates on racial groups' population shares;
controls included crime complaint rates, neighborhood socioeconomic
and other demographic characteristics, and size of the precinct's police
force. 90 The report found that black and Hispanic population share-strongly predicted stop rates, 91 and the district court agreed. 92
Highly localized demographic and socioeconomic data are readily
available (from the Census Bureau and other sources), but what about
crime data? Various crime statistics can also readily be obtained at
local levels (e.g., the precinct), but how well do these approximate rates
of actual crime, or for that matter, rates of "suspicious behavior?"

89

Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., 30-34, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
00
Id. The force size control means that the model does not test discrimination in allocation of
police among precincts. An alternative model omitted this control, and estimated larger race gaps.
Id. at 36.
91
Id. at 32-34. The plaintiffs' additional multilevel models assessed racial disparities within
precincts as well. Id. at 40-45. These models do not have individual-level controls for crime or
other confounders, which weakens their causal identification. However, because NYPD was
overwhelmingly stopping innocent people, the absence of crime controls may not be seriously
problematic; see supra note 55.
92
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
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Some scholars have used arrest rates to stand in for crime rates,
but this really should be avoided, because it again introduces
circularity. 93 Arrests are discretionary police decisions, and thus could
be infected by racial discrimination. When arrests are used as a crime
measure in stop-disparity studies, what is really being asked is not
"Does crime explain stop disparities?" but "How do stop disparities
compare to arrest disparities?"
A much better option is to control for the neighborhood's reported
crime rates, which principally come from calls made by citizens. 94 But
this approach still faces the problem that most crime is unreportedabout half of violent crimes and sixty percent of property crimes,
according to victim surveys, 95 while minor or victimless crimes are
almost never reported. 96 And reported crime might not be a race-neutral
(or neighborhood-neutral) proxy for actual crime, potentially biasing
analyses. This concern is amplified because (due to the extreme
underreporting of other crime types) reported-crime benchmarks are
usually based on the FBI's serious "index crimes," 97 violent crimes, or
just homicide. 98 But racial differences in crime rates are believed to be
far greater for violent crime, especially homicide, than for other
crimes. 99 If police stops are driven substantially by more minor crimes,
93

E.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE,
ETHNJCITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 318-19; Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the
NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. Assoc.
813, 818-20 (2007).
94
The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provide summary data for certain crimes, but
only collects race information for homicides. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNJTED STATES 2014, OFFENSES
KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (Fall 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/main/offenses-known-to-lawenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BMY-6BBN]. Some agencies participate in the National
Incident-Based Reporting System, which includes suspect race. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI,
NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, VOLUME 1: DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES 63--B4
(2000), http: //www2.fbi.gov/ucr/nibrs/manuals/v1all.pdf [https: //perma.cc/E7K5-CYH5). Some
studies use crime-report data from local sources. E.g., HOWARD P. GREENWALD ET AL., FINAL
REPORT: POLICE VEHICLE STOPS IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNJA 16--18 (2001); GREG RIDGEWAY,
RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP,
QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 13 (2006).
95
JENNJFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 235508, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION,
2010,
1
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflcv10.pdf
[https: //perma.cc nCEQ-JVMM].
96
Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 53, at 317.
97
The Uniform Crime Reports crime index includes murder, rape, arson, larceny, robbery,
burglary, car theft, and aggravated assault. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, EXPANDED
OFFENSE DATA (Fall 20 15), https: //www .fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-inthe-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-offense/expanded-offense/expandedoffense-data. pdf [https: //perma.cc /NFU8-9FXK].
98
E.g., Fagan et al., supra note 93, at 318-19 (using homicide); RIDGEWAY, supra note 94, at
xii, 16--19 (using violent crime).
99
Frase, supra note 77, at 238.
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using reported violent-crime rates as a proxy for all crime risks
substantially overstating the extent to which crime differences explain
stop disparities across neighborhoods.
Arguably, for the purpose of assessing police discrimination,
reported crime measures could be the right benchmark despite the
enormous amount of crime that gets left out of them, because "the
criminal justice process does not begin until the police become aware of
a crime." 100 That is, if you are trying to model the inputs into police
decision-making, you should not worry about the crime that the police
never hear about. This point is probably overstated, because in many
cities, a large fraction of policing is not report-driven at all, but
proactive-for example, patrol officers walking or driving the streets
looking for suspicious activity. 101 Still, surely police departments'
approaches to different neighborhoods are at least somewhat influenced
by reported crime levels. So reported-crime measures are probably
essential to include m neighborhood-level analyses of police
discrimination, and they are perhaps defensible proxies for
unmeasured (but observable-to-police) suspicious or criminal activity as
well. Researchers should, however, be cognizant of their limitations and
possible biases.
C.

Studies of Post-Stop Outcomes

While individual-level analyses of disparities in police stops have
been almost nonexistent, individual-level data have often been used to
study disparities in searches, arrests, or other sanctions among stopped
persons.l 02 These studies are made possible by the data that many
police departments require officers to collect on those they stop. On the
surface, these studies are more straightforward than attempts to
estimate stop disparities, because for each stopped individual, it
appears possible to observe all the key variables: what they were
stopped for, demographics, where the stop occurred, how they acted,
and the outcome of the stop. However, these studies raise substantial
causal inference challenges.
First, if there is racial discrimination in initial stops, the samples
of stopped persons of different races differ in unobservable ways,
introducing sample selection bias. For example, consider Smith and
100

Garland et al., supra note 50, at 19-20,
See RIDGEWAY, supra note 94, at 18 (finding thirty percent of NYPD stops were initiated by
citizen calls or suspect descriptions).
102
E.g., Pickerill et al., supra note 34, at 9--19; Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 45, at
192-98; Greg Ridgeway, Assessing the Effect of Race Bias in Post-Traffic Stop Outcomes Using
Propensity Scores, 22 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (2006).
101
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Petrocelli's study of Richmond traffic stops, which found that after
controlling for observable differences, stopped minority drivers were
substantially less likely to be ticketed or arrested. 103 The authors offer
two possible interpretations of their finding: first, that police
discriminated in favor of minorities, 104 or second, that they sanctioned
minorities less often because more minorities had been unjustifiably
stopped.l 05 Notice that these interpretations are effectively opposite,
and choosing between them reqmres assumptions about stop
decisions. 106
Second, these studies have often provided good illustrations of how
challenging it is to specify a model properly, including appropriate
control variables but not inappropriate ones. Studies of post-stop
disparities often include control variables that risk filtering out part of
the police discrimination that the study is trying to measure. For
example, analyses of search rates often control for whether the
individual is arrested or sanctioned. 107 The apparent rationale is that
arrests and sanctions reflect conduct, or that searches incident to arrest
are not discretionary. 108 But arrest and sanction decisions are
themselves discretionary. Moreover, some arrests result from searches,
not vice-versa, or may be motivated by the desire to carry out a search.
When studying search decisions, it is inappropriate to control for
something that is itself shaped by the search decision; doing so likely
biases estimates of unexplained disparity downward. These examples
illustrate that concerns about omitted variable bias cannot simply be
solved by a kitchen-sink approach to constructing a model-that is,
more control variables are not always better. If one is trying to study
police racial discrimination, variables likely to be influenced by that
very discrimination are ''bad controls."

103

Michael R. Smith & Matthew Petrocelli, Racial Profiling? A Multivariate Analysis of
Traffic Stop Data, 4 POLICE Q. 4, 18-20 (2001).
104
Id. The researchers posit that officers, aware that the research study was taking place,
may have altered their behavior when interacting with black drivers to avoid accusations of
racism.
105
Id.
106

A similar problem arises in studies of disparities in later process stages, such as sentencing
or plea-bargaining. Most such studies compound the problem by using samples consisting only of
sentenced cases and controlling for conviction severity, failing to account for disparities in charging
and plea-bargaining, in addition to police decision-making. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi,
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 39-77 (2013) (explaining this
problem).
107
See, e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 86, at 46-47 (controlling for whether the individual is
arrested); Pickerill et al., supra note 34, at 9-19 (controlling for the number of violations).
108
See Pickerill et al., supra note 34, at 15.
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That said, these research design choices are not always easy.
Consider the dilemma of whether to control for behavior recorded by
officers on stop forms. As discussed in Part I, officers' decisions about
what to write down could likewise be affected by race. Scholars have
nonetheless often included officers' descriptions as control variables,
implicitly treating them as accurate, exogenous descriptions of behavior
rather than as discretionary decisions. For example, a Cleveland study
found that arrest disparities disappeared after controlling for whether
police described drivers as noncompliant or disrespectful. 109 The RAND
study of NYPD's frisk, search, and sanction rates controlled for
"evasiveness, ... wearing clothes consistent with those commonly used
in crime, making furtive movements, acting in a manner consistent
with a drug transaction or a violent crime, or having a suspicious
bulge." 110
Other studies exclude such subjective factors from their models. I
believe this is the better choice, at least for factors that are easy to
manipulate. However, it does risk omitted-variable bias, because at
least sometimes the officers' descriptions presumably will be grounded
in actual conduct. There are no perfect choices. Ideally, researchers
should investigate whether their estimates are affected by alternative
choices on difficult model specification questions. Careful observational
studies of stops as well as post-stop outcomes are potentially
informative, but researchers must remember their limits.
D.

Exploiting Variations in Enforcers' Information About

Rae~

Alternatively, instead of simply trying to measure and control for
all confounding variables, researchers sometimes look for quasiexperimental approaches-that is, approaches that exploit natural
shocks to the treatment variable. While race itself is not subject to such
shocks, officers' perception of race sometimes is, and a few studies have
taken advantage of this fact. If racial disparity increases when officers
are likelier to know an individual's race, this increase can reasonably
be attributed to discrimination, assuming this change in knowledge is
not also accompanied by changes in other relevant factors.
Several studies have compared officers' traffic enforcement
decisions to truly race-blind mechanisms: traffic-camera citationslll

109
110

111

(2002).

Engel et al., supra note 72, at 297-99.
Ridgeway, supra note 102, at 34-35.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEP'T OF POLICE, TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS: THIRD REPORT
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and citations issued via aerial surveillance.l 12 These are very
informative designs, analogous to strong studies on other
discrimination questions-for example, research demonstrating
increased hiring of women when orchestras adopted blind auditions. 113
A limitation is that race information is not the only difference between
the human and the automated decision processes: automated and aerial
enforcement target only a subset of the violation types that human
officers respond to. 11 4
Several traffic-stop studies have exploited variation in race
information known to officers, on the theory that a driver's race is
harder to see at night. The studies compare stops at the same clock
time but on either side of Daylight Savings Time transitions, which
changes whether night has fallen. The intuition is that if racial
disparity is driven by discrimination, it should be reduced at night.
Studies in Portland and Cincinnati found no such reduction, concluding
that disparities were not caused by racial discrimination. 115 Studies in
Minneapolis and Syracuse reached the opposite conclusion; the
Syracuse study, unlike the others, accounted for variations in artificial
light. 116
One interpretive problem is that police and drivers may behave
differently when it is dark for reasons that have nothing to do with the
reduction in police ability to perceive drivers' race. If so, the research
design does not allow these race-neutral reasons to be disentangled
from the reduced race information. Darkness certainly affects driving
behavior, and could also affect police tactics, or police perceptions of
black criminality_117
Still, these studies are very clever and represent some of the
strongest observational research on policing disparity, and the general
strategy of exploiting variations in race information is promising.
112

E.H. McConnell & AR. Scheidegger, Race and Speeding Citations: Comparing Speeding
Citations Issued by Air Traffic Officers With Those Issued by Ground Traffic Officers, ANN. MTG.
ACAD. CRIM. JUST. SCI. (2001).
113
Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 737-38 (2000).
114
See Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 45, at 183 (citing these studies and raising this
concern).
115
Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from
Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 878 (2006); TERRY SCHELL ET AL., RAND CORP.,
POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI: YEAR THREE EVALUATION REPORT 27 (2007).
116
Joseph A Ritter & David Bael, Detecting Racial Profiling in Minneapolis Traffic Stops: A
New Approach, CURA REPORTER (Spring/Summer 2009) at 11-17; William C. Horrace & Shawn
M. Rohlin, How Dark Is Dark? Bright Lights, Big City, Racial Profiling, 98 REV. ECON. & STATS.
226, 231 (May 2016).
117
In general, fear of crime is dramatically higher at night. E.g., Kathleen A Fox et al.,
Gender, Crime Victimization, and Fear of Crime, 22 SECURITY J. 24, 35 (2009).
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However, the potential of this research design is limited to narrow
contexts: those in which enforcement decisions can be made without
close-range observation of suspects.
E.

Lab Experiments on Implicit Biases

Aside from these observational approaches, many lab experiments
demonstrate the prevalence of "implicit racial bias," including
association of blackness with criminality.l 18 For example, Eberhardt et
al. showed that police subjects who were primed subconsciously with
crime-related images paid disproportionate attention to black faces. 119
A subset of this literature tests "shooter bias," using computer
simulations; subjects are asked to "shoot" armed characters. These
tests find that players pick the right response faster if the image
matches stereotypes (e.g., armed black characters).l 20
These studies are randomized experiments-the "gold standard"
for causal inference. Many are quite small. But outside the lab,
Internet-administered implicit bias tests have been taken by millions of
people. Some test the association between blackness and weapons,
which is prevalent: one analysis found that seventy-two percent of
respondents showed this association, and only nine percent showed the
reverse. 121 Internet administration means test-taking conditions and
samples are not controlled and respondents are not blind to the study's
purpose. But people who choose to test themselves might be less biased ·
than average (although this is speculative, of course), and most·
respondents are presumably trying to achieve an "unbiased" score.
This research strongly indicates that implicit racial bias is
prevalent among police-but not limited to them. Police and civilian
subjects score similarly, and on some tasks police make fewer mistakes

118
See, e.g., B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias, 15 CURRENT DIR. IN PSYCH. SCI. 287 (2006)
(reviewing literature); Quillian, supra note 61, at 314-20 (same); CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN
INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wpcontent/u ploads/20 14/03/2014-implicit-bias. pdf [https: //perma .cc /J 5AP-BFY4] (same).
119
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 876, 885-88 (2004) (also finding that crime-primed officers were more
likely to wrongly pick a more racially "stereotypical" black face out of a lineup); Heather M Kleider
et al., Looking Like a Criminal, 40 MEMORY & COGNITION 1200, 1200 (2012) (reaching similar
findings with student subjects).
120
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 8 Soc. & PERS. PSYCH. COMPASS 201, 206-07 (2014); Anthony G. Greenwald
et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effect of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPER.
Soc. PSYCH. 399, 401-03 (2003).
121
Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes,
2007 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 1, 20 (2007).
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overall. 122 As Tonry puts it, given the bias found among "every
imaginable group in the population, it would be remarkable if criminal
justice practitioners were not affected." 123 Surveys have also shown
widespread tendencies to explicitly associate blackness with
criminality, 124 and overt endorsement of racial discrimination among a
small but nontrivial subset of white respondents.l 25
The great unknown is how implicit bias affects real-world police
decisions. 126 A key next step is to link implicit bias scores to real-world
policing outcomes-for example, within police departments, do
individual officers' scores tend to predict racial disparity in their stop
rates? If so, it would support police efforts to reduce implicit bias,
perhaps via "debiasing" trainings or by using implicit bias testing in
hiring.l 27 If not, it might suggest that the recent focus by many
departments and researchers on implicit bias (rather than explicit bias
or behavior) is misguided. Such studies would have limitations: while
the tests are controlled experiments, using their results to explain realworld outcomes involves the usual causal-inference challenges of
observational research. For example, an officer's experiences could
influence both her implicit bias scores and her stop practices. Still, such
studies could be a promising approach to assessing one plausible
mechanism for disparities.

III. AUDITING: A FIELD EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
As the review in the last Part suggests, evaluating police racial
discrimination is truly difficult, and despite decades of serious effort,
our existing tools have serious shortcomings. Most observational
methods suffer from data shortcomings and causal inference
challenges; quasi-experimental methods are of limited applicability;

122

Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1006; see generally Correll et al., supra note
120, at 206.
123
Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the
American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 287 (2010).
124
James D. Unnever, Race, Crime, and Public Opinion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 70, 71 (Sandra M. Bucerius & Michael Tonry eds. 2014).
125
See, e.g., Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black- White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958,
GALLUP (July 25, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-marriage-blacks-whites.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Y825-JAL4] (reporting 2013 poll showing that only eighty-four percent of white
Americans approve of interracial marriage).
126
E.g., BLANK ET AL., supra note 37, at 72 ("[L]aboratory effects ... can rarely tell us the
extent to which naturally observed disparities are the result of discrimination.").
127
Caution is appropriate; due to random variation, any one individual's score may not mean
much. However, this problem could probably be mitigated by using more extensive or repeated
testing.
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and lab research has uncertain implications for the "real world."
Accordingly, I propose a new method to supplement the existing toolkit:
the use of "testers," also known as "auditing." While the term "auditing"
has various meanings in other contexts, in antidiscrimination research
it is usually used to refer to field studies that compare the treatment of
paired individuals ("testers") who are similar but for a specific
characteristic such as race. Such methods are used often m
discrimination research and civil rights law enforcement in areas such
as employment, housing, and lending. I propose using testers (probably
undercover police) to interact with police or to stage behavior that could
attract their attention. Although it raises potential ethical, safety,
legal, and political concerns, which I address here, this approach has
substantial promise, capturing most of the advantages of lab
experiments while directly testing real-world behavior.
A.

Auditing in Research and Civil Rights Enforcement

A good example of the auditing approach is Ayres and Siegelman's
study of race and sex discrimination by auto dealers.l 28 The authors
matched white male testers with black male, black female, and white
female counterparts based on age, education, and assessed
attractiveness. 129 The testers all wore similar clothing and drove
similar cars to the dealerships, where they negotiated prices on cars;
black testers got substantially worse offers. 130 Other studies have used
auditing to study housing and employment markets, 131 in addition to·
various other phenomena-for example, a recent study found that ·
drivers are less willing to yield to black jaywalkers. 132
Some studies manipulate only written information, such as
employment applications,133 student emails to professors, 134 and writing

128

Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New
Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995).
129
Id. at 306.
1 0
"
Id. at 319. The evidence of gender discrimination was less clear.
m E.g., John Yinger, Measuring Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986); see BLANK ET AL., supra note 37, at 106-07 (reviewing housing
research); P.A. Riach & J. Rich, Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place, 112
ECON. J. F480, F510-F513 (2002) (same); Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies
of Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 104, 114 (2007) (reviewing
employment research); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. Soc. 937 (2003)
(studying effects of criminal records and race on employment).
132
Tara Goddard et a!., Racial Bias in Driver Yielding Behavior at Crosswalks, 33
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART F 1, 5 (2015); see BLANK ET AL., supra note 37, at 104-08
(reviewing auditing literature); Riach & Rich, supra note 131.
133
E.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
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samples. 135 Such designs allow true experimental manipulation of race
and gender, which in-person auditing does not quite achieve: one can
randomize cases between testers, but one cannot make the same tester
white in one case and black in another. Instead, in-person auditing
depends on careful matching and training to minimize within-pair
variation.
No similar studies address U.S. law enforcement. In 1994, a
criminal defendant introduced evidence from testers that he had hired
to assess whether race affected Border Patrol stops. But the experiment
was tiny, and the unpersuaded court observed that many conditions
had not been held constant. 136 A Mexico City study used testers who
committed illegal left turns to test socioeconomic status effects on police
demands for bribes. 137 Another study focused on private party
suspicions of crime, testing store clerks' reactions to white and black
shoppers. 138 An ABC News mini-experiment likewise tested private
observers: actors cut the lock off a bicycle, and passerby reactions to the
black actor were much more hostile_139
The use of testers is also a well-established civil rights enforcement
strategy. In the 1950s, testers brought suits challenging public transit
discrimination, and the Supreme Court held that testers could have
standing. 140 Testers have played a prominent role in housing
discrimination enforcement; the federal government has funded large
tester studies and backed tester lawsuits brought by local fair housing
associations.l 41 Testers have also brought challenges to lending
991 (2004); Pager, supra note 131, at 942-43 (reviewing studies).
134
Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How
Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway Into Organizations, 100 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1678, 1696--98 (2015).
135
Arin N. Reeves, Nextions, Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in
Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills
4-6 (2014),
http://www.nextions.com/wpcontent lfiles_mf/144682264 72014040114 WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS. pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DHV-N2AN].
136
United States v. Beasley, 36 F.3d 1106, No. 94-2026, No. 94-2065 (lOth Cir. 1994)
(unpublished table decision).
137
Brian J. Fried et al., Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV.
76 (2010).
138
George E. Schreer et al., "Shopping While Black": Examining Racial Discrimination in a
Retail Setting, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432 (2009).
139
What
Would
You
Do? (Bike
Thief)
(ABC
television
broadcast
2010),
http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=SOkV_b3IK9M [https:l/perma.cc/Z7ZS-E8N7].
140
Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam).
141
See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that a tester could have
standing if he could show actual injury); Michael Selmi, Public us. Private Enforcement of Civil
Rights, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1426 (1998); MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS
2000 (2002).
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discrimination, 142 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has endorsed their use to challenge hiring discrimination, though few
cases have been brought.l43
B.

Auditing the Police: Key Research Design Considerations

Is auditing the police realistic? This has not been done before, 144
and there are some good reasons for that-but I believe these concerns
can be addressed with careful research design. Here, I address several
objectives that researchers must balance: safety, legality, importance,
methodological rigor, statistical power, and cost concerns.
1. Safety.
A paramount concern that will limit the potential scope of this
approach is minimizing risk to testers, police, and third parties. The
research designs I propose below involve no serious law-breaking, nor
do they suggest a violent situation. They are not designed to test arrest
probability, but to potentially elicit relatively minimal police
interactions. Testers must be trained to be absolutely cooperative. The
safest approach would involve law enforcement participation: voluntary
or court-ordered police department self-monitoring or outside civilrights agency investigations. Ideally, testers could be undercover
agents-people who regularly carry out far riskier work than this-and
police backup could be ready to intervene if any safety threat arises.
The designs proposed below also pose minimal risk to the officers
being studied. With just one or two interactions with each officer, they
would be used to diagnose broad patterns, not to identify individual
''bad apples." They also involve very minimal officer time, mm1m1zmg
distraction from ordinary public-safety duties.

142

Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage Lending Discrimination Cases, 41
URB. LAW. 319, 326-36 (2009).
143
EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N., DEC. NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
WHETHER "TESTERS" CAN FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
(May 22, 1996); Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling
Bias in Hiring, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 238, 256 (2012).
144
Indeed, aside from the Beasley defendant's effort, see supra note 136, it has hardly been
suggested. One scholarly piece and one news article each give the idea a sentence or two. Pamela
S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2008
(1998); Emily Badger, Why It's So Hard to Study Racial Profiling By Police, WASH. POST (Apr. 30,
20 14), https: //www. washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/20 14/04/30/it-is-exceptionally-hard- to- getgood-data -on-racial-bias-in- policing I [https: //perma .cc /EE24-NTP3]. Reviews of methods for
studying racial profiling omit it; for example, Blank et al. don't mention auditing in their chapter
on police, even though they endorse it for other contexts like housing. BLANKET AL., supra note 37,
at 103-17, 186-202.
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2. Legality.
The criminal law constrains staging of actual crimes, lying to the
police, and recording of interactions. 145 This is another advantage of
governmental involvement. Undercover police routinely participate in
otherwise-criminal activity and enjoy effective immunity from
prosecution. 146 Private testers cannot be asked to commit serious
crimes, but might choose to risk minor violations, as did researchers in
several studies mentioned above: Lamberth's Turnpike study, 147 the
jaywalking study, 14 8 and the Mexico City bribery study. 149 Most of the
designs proposed below involve no lawbreaking or lying, just potentially
suspicious activity.
3. Importance.
Studies should focus on contexts in which there is reason to suspect
discrimination (for example, large raw disparities, or citizen
complaints) and in which discrimination would have meaningful
consequences. But such contexts need not involve serious crimes.
Misdemeanor enforcement can result in detention and substantial
collateral consequences, can be highly stressful, may be a pretext to
look for more serious criminality, 150 and may be a method of expanding
the surveillance "net," exposing arrestees to more police interactions in
the future.l 51
4. Methodological rigor.
The most obvious requirement for effective auditing is that the
deception must work. The interaction should thus be quite ordinary,
brief, and forgettable. Observations should be distributed across police

145
In most states, anyone may record their own interactions without permission, though some
states require two-party consent. REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
REPORTER'S RECORDING GUIDE 2-3 (2012), http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/RECORDING.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FUZ-UX8X]. There may also be a constitutional right to record police, e.g., Glik
v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011), though some courts have found only a right to
openly record the police, Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614-15 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
146
Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime,
62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157, 165--69 (2009).
147
LAMBERTH, supra note 84.
148
Goddard et al., supra note 132.
149
Fried et al., supra note 137.
150
See supra note 16 (discussing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). Arrestees may
be searched without warrants.
151
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 632-33, 639 (2014).
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beats and shifts and across time, so individual officers are unlikely to
notice patterns.
The primary threat to causal inference from auditing studies is
tester heterogeneity, 152 so testers should be matched carefully_153 Subtle
differences may remain, but training combined with simple, easy-toreplicate "scripts" can make these less likely to affect outcomes.
Analyses could focus on outcomes, like whether any interaction occurs
that is unaffected by subtle differences in conversational styles.
Optimally, the testers should be blind to the study's purpose (for
example, they could be told they are testing enforcement without
mentioning the racial dimension), 154 though this might be hard to pull
off. But testers' activities could be recorded and later coded by persons
who are blind to the purpose.
One possible interpretive challenge is discerning whether racial
differences in police actions might result from disparities in citizens'
calls to the police, rather than police discrimination. With police
department cooperation, this mechanism could be teased out, because
the police could collect information on citizen calls.

5. Statistical power and cost.
The sample size must provide sufficient statistical power to
produce reasonably precise estimates.l 55 Ideally, this means at least
hundreds of observations 156-a plausible number (large cities have
thousands of officers), provided the tests are spread across beats and
shifts.l 57 Many published auditing studies have much smaller samples,

152

See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 108-09

(1998).
153

See Pager, supra note 131, at 111-12, 123-24. But researchers should avoid too-perfect
matches on traits that themselves signify race (e.g., hair). See Riach & Rich, supra note 131, at
F483-F484.
154
See, e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 128, at 307 (using blind testers).
155
Power analyses are typically framed in terms of hypothesis-testing, wherein power is the
probability of obtaining a statistically significant result if the "true" effect is of a certain size.
Power depends on sample size, the size of effect one seeks to detect, the statistical significance
threshold, and (for binary outcomes) the baseline frequency of the outcomes.
156
Sample-size calculators are widely available; they require assumptions about effect size.
For example, if one seeks eighty percent power with a ninety-five confidence level, assuming the
true probabilities for the two groups are thirty percent and forty percent respectively, a common
power formula requires a total sample size of 708. See Power (Sample Size) Calculators, SEALED
ENVELOPE, h ttps: //www. sealeden velope.com/power/binary -superiority/ [https: //perma.cc /G P7355UV] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). If the probabilities were thirty percent and fifty percent, the
sample size required would be smaller (182).
157
For example, the Chicago police department has 279 distinct beats, each patrolled by eight
or nine officers. Beat Officers, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, http://home.chicagopolice.org/get-involved-withcaps/how-caps-works/beat-officers/ [https: //perma.cc /AG4B-YYNR].
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allowing them to detect only large effects, and even then, imprecisely. 158
Although larger samples produce greater power, they cost more, and
may increase the risk of police noticing patterns. This is another reason
to use designs that involve low-intensity, brief, forgettable
interactions-they can be repeated more often at reasonable cost.
C.

Possible Research Designs

Here, I list a few examples of research designs, leaving the details
to be tailored to the city and police force.
Open Container I Minor in Possession. Testers could walk past beat
officers carrying a container of liquid, such as a soda bottle that
resembles a beer bottle, testing whether they are asked what is in it. If
the containers do not actually contain alcohol, suspicion could be
immediately dispelled.
Loitering. Testers, in same-race pairs, could hang out in public,
testing whether police approach. To increase rates of police
interactions, testers could engage in further "nuisance" activity, like
playing music or smoking, or wear bulky clothing.
Casing. Testers could wait outside jewelry or other stores, looking
in-behavior that could be construed either as "window-shopping" or
"casing."
Bike or Car Theft. Testers could break a bike lock or break into a
car using a coat hanger-like the ABC News video described above, 159
but larger-scale. In the car example, testers could carry the registration
so as to dispel suspicion quickly. A challenge will be objectively
differentiating hostile interactions from offers to help.
Traffic Violations. Testers could break traffic laws and see if they
get stopped (and searched). While safety would be a concern, some
traffic violations could pose little or no danger-for example, expired or
missing license plates.
Checkpoints. Checkpoints are promising settings for auditing: some
law enforcement contact is guaranteed, the location is fixed, the setting
is highly monitored and low-risk, and the testers' activity (just passing
through) would be unremarkable. 160 Outcomes to be measured could
include time elapsed during an encounter or the rate of diversion for

158

E.g., Fried et al., supra note 137, at 83 (42 tests); Schreer et al., supra note 138, at 1438
(thirty-three tests, six stores).
159
Supra note 139.
160
Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing observational checkpoint studies).
Testers would have some advantages versus other approaches to studying checkpoints, in that one
can easily hold constant subtle behaviors or differences in verbal responses that might be difficult
for observational researchers to measure and code.

485]

TESTING RACIAL PROFILING

525

extra searches. Agency cooperation, while not essential, would help; it
would allow access to the information agents obtain when they run
individuals' identification.
Manipulation of Victim Reports, Police Files, and Training
Exercises. Other strategies could avoid in-person police encounters.
''Victims" (perhaps themselves of varied race) could call in crime
reports with varied suspect race, to test differences in dispatchers'
response (assuming a mechanism is in place to quickly cancel the
investigation). Race could be manipulated in training exercises
involving assessment of case files or descriptions. Manipulation of
police files could also be used to test prosecutors' charging or intake
decisions.
Responding to Citizen Complaints. Officers that staff citizen
outreach or internal affairs departments could be tested to see if they
respond differently to complaints about officers depending on the
complainant's race. 161 The test should focus on initial intake, with' a
mechanism for stopping the ensuing investigations.
D.

Advantages and Limitations

In real life, race mediates the lives people lead, but auditing
measures disparate treatment of individuals who are doing the same
thing in the same places. This is both a strength and a limitation. On
the one hand, it enables sound causal inferences: if we eliminate
differences other than race, we can more confidently attribute disparate
outcomes to racial discrimination. Auditing designs would be much
better tailored to isolate the effects of racial discrimination than
regression studies and other observational approaches. If testers are
matched and trained well, it could approximate a true experiment, but
in a real-life setting, not a labJ6 2
The downside is that auditing may miss dimensions of real-world
racial discrimination. For example, if the police heavily target young
men who dress a certain way, and virtually all such young men are
black, perhaps clothing style is not a confounder that should be filtered
out via the use of identically dressed testers, but rather a race proxy-a
mechanism for racially disparate treatment. Similarly, most of the

161

See, e.g., RICHARD J. DAVIS, NEW YORK COMM'N TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, FOLLOWUP REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU COMMAND CENTER 1-5, 17 (1999) (describing
center that takes 20,000 complaints per year); see also Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of
Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 456-59 (2001) (discussing their phone-based auditing study).
162

See Quillian, supra note 61, at 303 ("[A]udit studies often are the best method for
measuring ... discrimination.").
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designs above would test disparities within neighborhoods (or at
checkpoints), and would miss differences driven by neighborhood racial
composition. Auditing is best designed to address intra-neighborhood
disparities, which is an important limitation, although it bears
emphasis that even if this were all it was good for, it would fill an
important gap. As Part II illustrated, regression methods are a
reasonably effective tool for estimating inter-neighborhood disparities;
it is the disparate treatment of individuals within neighborhoods that
is the most difficult to get at using observational methods, because of
the absence of individual-level data.
The auditing design could, in any event, be extended to test the
effects of the neighborhood or other race-correlated variables and their
interaction with individual race-for example, by changing the same
testers' clothing or sending them to different neighborhoods. An
advantage over observational studies of inter-neighborhood disparities
is that this approach could rule out, as an explanation for those
disparities, inter-neighborhood differences in the behavior of the
individuals being approached. That is, if testers act the same in every
neighborhood, systematic differences in their treatment across
neighborhoods would provide strong evidence that it is not the testers,
but an actual difference in police approaches. Still, even if auditing
reveals inter-neighborhood disparities, it would not necessarily mean
that that difference is because of neighborhood racial composition. 163
Similarly, evidence that the police disfavor some characteristic like a
clothing style would not definitively prove that they are using it as a
race proxy.
Auditing would produce context-specific estimates, not an overall
measure of racial discrimination in stops or arrests. 164 These estimates
will be more informative if the test is similar to some class of activity
that produces a reasonable share of the department's stops or arrests.
Loitering and minor-in-possession are good examples.
E.

Implementation

Given its longstanding role in civil rights enforcement, federal or
state agencies' use of auditing to assess police disparities is plausible.
Tester programs in other areas have sometimes been controversial, 165
163
Researchers could try to account for other neighborhood differences by adding the same
sorts of controls (e.g., reported crime rate differences) that observational studies do.
164
Cf. Heckman, supra note 152, at 102-11 (criticizing employment audit studies for not
estimating market discrimination).
165
See Selmi, supra note 141, at 1427; Alex Young K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect
Discrimination: An Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 480 (1993) (citing
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and certainly may be in this context as well, but there are
countervailing political pressures. In surveys, large majorities oppose
racial profiling.l 66 The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice has a strong interest in the issue and in police abuses
generally, 167 and the issue has been a high overall priority following
recent events.l 68 Outside-agency auditing would lose some of the
advantages of police-department self-monitoring (for example, access to
internal data), but outside auditors could still employ trained
undercover officers and protect them from physical or legal harm. The
outside-enforcement approach would face less risk of being
compromised by leaks or internal resistance. It is the most plausible
strategy when a police department is hostile to scrutiny.
Auditing could also be required by court order or settlement in civil
rights litigation. Analogously, the New Jersey Attorney General's office
carried out a major benchmarking study under a settlement with the
U.S. Department of Justice.l 69 Outside monitors have been appointed
for numerous police departments, often under consent decrees. 17 0
Voluntary self-auditing by police departments is promising, but is
it realistic? Mter all, adverse findings could be embarrassing and invite
litigation. Moreover, the studies could be resource-intensive and risk
angering officers and unions. Still, while many departments would
doubtless reject the idea, the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the
U.S. are not monolithic. Typically, agency heads are political
appointees, and there is no reason to assume that all cities' political

employer fears of tester litigation).
166
Emily Eakins, Poll: 70% of Americans Oppose Racial Profiling by the Police, REASON
FOUNDATION (Oct. 14, 2014), http;//reason.com/poll/2014/10/14/poll-70-of-americans-oppose-racialprofi [https: //perma.cc/84GM-CQ2E].
167
See Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, http://www .justice.gov/crt/about/spl!documents/polmis.php [https: //perma.cc n77 JDAQM]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/ag /pages/ attachments/20 14/12/08/use-of-race-policy. pdf [https: //perma.cc IW 5LX -JBBE].
16
"
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Eric Holder on Latest
Developments in Ferguson, Missouri (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/statementattorney- general-eric-holder-latest-developments-ferguson- missouri
[https: //perma.cc /5PYGXES9].
169
See Lange et al., supra note 85, at 196-97.
170
See, e.g., Agency Profiles, NAT'L ASSOC. FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENF'T,
http: //www.nacole.org /agency_profiles [https: //perma.cc!SP6M-3XT6] (providing detailed profiles
of civilian oversight agencies); see also Sanchez et al., supra note 32 (describing the three-year
monitoring plan adopted by New York City as part of the settlement reached in the Floyd
litigation); Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement Is Beneficial and Needed-Both Inside
and Out, 30 PACE L. REV. 1548, 1550 (2010).
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leaders would be primarily interested in hiding racial discrimination
rather than eliminating it.
Hundreds of police departments have already invested
considerable resources in collecting racial disparity data, and many
have carried out ambitious studies.l 71 Some police departments have
"early warning" programs to identify individual problem officersY 2 Any
of these programs risk litigation or officer backlash-indeed, programs
that risk getting individual officers in trouble may raise a worse risk of
backlash than auditing does.l 73 These risks have not precluded these
programs' adoption.
There is substantial precedent for using undercover police work to
help departments self-diagnose problems. Some departments use a
practice called "red teaming" to test police responses to security threats
and emergency situations.l 74 Undercover agents are also often
employed in police corruption investigations.l 75 Several police
departments (including New York and Los Angeles) regularly conduct
"random integrity tests"-exposing officers to random stings.17 6
Corruption is likely as embarrassing to police departments as racial
discrimination is-yet these departments have carried out the
corruption equivalent of auditing.
Even if departments can be persuaded to undertake auditing
studies, can they be trusted not to undermine their accuracy? Internal
affairs divisions and police leadership have often been sharply

171

See, e.g., ENGEL et al., supra note 85; Law Enforcement, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY,
http: 1/policingequity.org/law-enforcement/ [https: //perma.cc/2RHV-32X8] (describing CPE's work
with police departments).
172
Robin S. Engel & Jennifer Calnon, Comparing Benchmark Methodologies for Police Citizen
Contacts: Traffic Stop Data Collection for the Pennsylvania State Police, 7 POLICE Q. 97, 109
(2004); see RIDGEWAY, supra note 94, at 21-30.
173
Unions generally strongly oppose policies with potential adverse consequences for
individual officers. Engel & Calnon, supra note 172, at 109; Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker,
An Impediment to Police Officer Accountability?, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 198--99 (2005).
174
The term comes from military wargaming exercises. Michael K. Meehan, Red Teaming for
Law Enforcement, 74 POLICE CHIEF 22; see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Subject Bibliography:
Red Teaming, https: //www.hsdl.org /?view&did=702932 [https: //perma.cc/9VB6-MKUX] (collecting
sources); William H. Adcox, The Red Team: An Innovative Quality Control Practice in Facility
Security, 74 POLICE CHIEF 54 (2007) (describing "breach exercise[s]" carried out by undercover
teams at protected facilities).
175
E.g., Steve Rothlein, Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute, Conducting Integrity
Tests on Law Enforcement Officers, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2010),
http://www. patc.com/weeklyarticles/printlle_integrity_tests.pdf [https: //perma.cc /9B3D-SH9C]; see
Tim Prenzler & Carol Ronken, Police Integrity Testing in Australia, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST.
319, 319 (2001) (describing undercover integrity testing in Australia as an "essential"
anticorruption tool).
176
Rothlein, supra note 175; Prenzler & Ronken, supra note 175, at 321-23; Sanja Kutnjak
lvkovic, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 617-19 (2003).
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criticized for papering over police misconduct and corruption. 177 Under
the right conditions, however, the prospects for effectiveness are
reasonable. Self-studies will be more credible if undertaken together
with outside watchdog organizations or academic researchers who have
control over data collection and analysis 178-provided those outside
actors are truly independent.l 79 Undercover agents, presumably
borrowed from other departments, would have to be carefully chosen,
because they would have to be trusted not to tip off other officers or to
try to manipulate the study's findings. 180
If police departments are reluctant to expose themselves to liability
or criticism, they could conduct internal auditing programs without
publicizing results, or ask academic collaborators to publish
anonymized results. To encourage self-studies, legislatures could
consider creating evidentiary privileges. Congress has enacted just
such "self-testing" privileges for mortgage lenders and creditors in the
Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 181 · The
privileges apply only if, upon discovering evidence of discrimination,
the lender undertakes "appropriate corrective action." 182 If legislatures
applied similar privileges to police self-testing, they would be modest
extensions of the "self-criticism privileges" that law enforcement
agencies already often invoke (which cover subjective analyses but not
underlying facts)_183
If government involvement proves impracticable, academic
researchers might be able to carry out some of the designs on their own,

177

E.g., Ivkovic, supra note 176, at 596-97.
This is the modus operandi of the Center for Policing Equity, which connects researchers
with police departments. See Law Enforcement, supra note 171; see Merrick Bobb, Civilian
Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151, 159-63 (2003)
(describing some departments' voluntary use of accountability organizations, independent
investigators, and civilian review boards to monitor use of force and corruption).
179
Civilian oversight boards have often been criticized for being overly deferential to police.
E.g., Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian
Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 11-12
(2009). Academic researchers with external (non-police) funding may be better equipped to provide
accountability, but it will be important to negotiate agreements preserving researchers' control
over reporting of results.
180
Cf. Riach & Rich, supra note 131, at F483 (worrying that "consciously or unconsciously,
minority applicants may be motivated to prove the existence of discrimination."); see also
Heckman, supra note 152, at 104. When police are investigating police, one might worry more
about the opposite concern.
181
See Tomkowiak, supra note 142, at 325-27.
182
Id.
178

183
See Josh Jones, Note, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the Self-Critical
Analysis Privilege, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1611-14 (2003). Federal privilege legislation
could be grounded in Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and could perhaps
extend to state courts.
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although this would entail greater challenges. Academic research is
governed by Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight, 184 but IRBs
generally focus on harms to subjects (here, police) and perhaps third
parties. Here, essentially all the risk is on the research staff (the
testers).l 85 Even if an IRB decides such risks are outside its purview,
ethical researchers should consider them. While well-informed research
staff should be free to take on projects carrying non-zero risk (as much
research entails), supervisors should aim to minimize the risk to
research staffers, especially if they are students who may be reluctant
to refuse. Designs such as passing through security checkpoints, for
instance, may satisfy this requirement, at least if the researchers
breach no laws (such as prohibitions of recording devices).
Overall, while auditing designs could face serious practical and
political hurdles, their use is plausible. They offer a potentially
valuable new addition to the toolkit of researchers, civil rights agencies,
and police departments. While what they measure is limited, it is
exactly the thing that observational tools have in most contexts been
unable to measure effectively: disparate treatment among similarly
situated individuals, rather than neighborhoods.
IV. CONCLUSION
Empirical research on race and policing poses many challenges, but
it is worth trying to overcome these challenges because the stakes of
the legal and policy debates such research seeks to inform are high. In
many communities of color, intensive police presence fundamentally
shapes daily life. Racial disparities in policing have recently come to
the forefront of the national conversation, but they are not new; despite
decades of research, we still do not have a clear picture of the reasons
for them.
Constitutional litigation can be a valuable tool for redressing
disparities, and constitutional doctrine specifically asks us to identify
whether racially disparate outcomes are the result of disparate
treatment by the police. Many police departments themselves care
about this question, having committed to the elimination of racial
profiling. But in most contexts, we simply do not have the data and the
statistical tools to engage in this kind of causal analysis, and we may
need to turn to new ways of generating new kinds of data that allow

184

This may be true even if researchers work with government, depending on their roles.
Research guidelines also generally permit dispensing with informed consent if the research
design requires it (as it does here) and the potential harm is minimal. See Pager, supra note 131,
at 126.
185
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more rigorous analyses. The use of testers is one approach worth
considering seriously.
There are multiple promiSmg empirical strategies for analyzing
racial disparities, and I do not suggest that the use of field experiments
is likely to displace the need for careful observational analyses. Such
analyses have already provided useful insights on some questions, and
I have suggested some ways to push observational research further,
such as the creation of more ambitious surveys about behavior and
police-citizen contacts. But such research will always face omittedvariable and causal-inference challenges, and experimental work can
be a very useful supplement. Current research has, in substantial
ways, fallen short, despite decades of serious and resource-intensive
efforts. It is time to think creatively about new solutions.

